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‘The wise man will wage just wars’ 
- Augustine of Hippo, 426 AD 
 
 
 
 
‘We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting 
military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war; to defuse a powder keg at the 
heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic 
results. And we act to stand united with our allies for peace. By acting now we 
are upholding our values, protecting our interests and advancing the cause for 
peace.’ 
- William J. Clinton, March 23, 1999 
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Introduction 
 
On March 24, 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force, a bombing campaign against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. The campaign was a response to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. Over 
the course of the previous year, hostilities between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the separatist 
Kosovo Liberation Army had escalated. The Yugoslav army launched a campaign of terror that resulted in 
the death of thousands of civilians and the displacement of several hundred thousand refugees. The 
United Nations Security Council passed several resolutions condemning the violence but did not authorise 
military action to end it. In March 1999, peace talks between the two sides broke down. Shortly 
afterwards, NATO commenced air strikes. Hostilities continued until June 10, when the Yugoslavian 
government in Belgrade agreed to a ceasefire and withdrew its troops from Kosovo. A NATO 
peacekeeping force was then formed which remains in Kosovo to this day. 
 
NATO's decision to intervene in Kosovo has been the subject of extensive debate and controversy. US 
President Bill Clinton proudly called the intervention in Kosovo 'the first ever humanitarian war.'1 At the 
time, however, states like Russia, China and India argued that NATO actions were illegitimate because of 
the absence of a mandate from the Security Council. Others criticised NATO for acting on its own 
interests rather than on humanitarian motives. NATO responded to these criticisms in three ways. Firstly, 
they advanced the argument that their actions were legal, referring to resolutions passed by the UN 
Security Council condemning the violence in Kosovo. Many observers have questioned the validity of this 
argument, instead preferring the oft-heard phrase 'illegal but legitimate.' Secondly, they stated that the 
conflict, with its potentially destabilising effect on the region, represented a security threat to NATO which 
warranted action by the alliance. Thirdly, they claimed a moral imperative to act in the face of human 
rights abuses. In a speech to NATO's peacekeeping forces in Kosovo, Clinton clearly stated his intentions. 
'If somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their 
ethnic background or their religion, and it's within our power to stop it, we will stop it.'2 UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair acknowledged that there were interests at stake: 'there are all those strategic reasons and 
they are important and I don’t wish to diminish them in any way at all. But I think there is a proper sense 
of moral outrage at what Milosevic has done that we should not shy away from but should be proud of 
feeling.'3 Without denying the strategic interests that were at stake, both Clinton and Blair appealed to a 
sense of moral responsibility to act in the face of a humanitarian crisis.  
 
More than any other area of foreign policy, humanitarian intervention raises questions about a state's 
motivation to act. Claiming to act on ethical motives makes a politician vulnerable to all kinds of criticism, 
in particular the accusation that his stated motives are not pure or not valid or that they are nothing but 
window dressing to obscure less palatable motives. Sceptics question why a politician, much less an 
entire state, would stick out his head for anybody unless he would somehow benefit from it himself. This 
is based on the assumption that interests and values as motives are mutually exclusive. Even when they 
are both valid, one will usually be decisive, and it is usually interests. Scholars of international relations 
                                               
1 R.C. Diprizio, Armed humanitarians: US interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo (2002), 130 
2 Remarks by the president to KFOR troops, Skopje, June 22, 1999. available at: http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/Europe-
9906/html/Speeches/990622d.html 
3 Press Conference Given by the NATO Secretary General, Mr Javier Solana, and the British Prime Minister, Mr Tony Blair, April 20, 
1999. available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990420a.htm 
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have advanced different ideas on the relationship between interests and values in motivating state 
behaviour. The classical rationalist school, which comprises both the neorealist and the neoliberal 
traditions, maintains that ultimately, states always act to defend their own interests. Drawing on Kenneth 
Waltz, neorealists claim that the defining characteristic of the international system which distinguishes it 
from, for example, the domestic realm, is the absence of central, overarching authority. This results in 
anarchy and a system of self-help. States engage in a constant struggle to survive by maximising their 
power relative to other states. The key to understanding state behaviour in the international arena is 
therefore understanding how they defend their interests. To explain NATO's intervention in Kosovo, 
therefore, rationalists would try to identify what interests were at stake and what options the key players 
had to defend those interests. Moral arguments were insignificant except to justify the actions that were 
taken. Neoliberals agree with the main tenets of this narrative although they attach less causal 
significance to anarchy and point out that states can also pursue their interests through international 
cooperation.  
 
The rationalist line of reasoning has strong explanatory power for classic security dilemmas like those of 
the Cold War. But when it comes to explaining issues like human rights and humanitarian intervention, it 
comes up short. The rationalists dismiss convictions and ideas as motivations for state actions. However, 
if moral arguments do not play a role in shaping state behaviour, why did human rights become an 
increasingly pressing issue during the 1990s? And why did NATO leaders feel such a strong need to 
appeal to humanitarian norms in defending their intervention in Kosovo? By reducing international politics 
to a system of self-help, rationalism fails to address the role of values and ideas in shaping state 
behaviour. A number of alternative explanations have gained popularity. One is the constructivist school. 
Constructivists like Alexander Wendt and Martha Finnemore agree with the rationalist claim that states 
primarily act to defend their own interests. However, they point out that state interests are not objective 
facts. Instead, perceptions of interests are shaped by state identities, which are socially constructed.4 As 
a result, constructivists believe that ideas and norms can influence state behaviour. They argue that 
states act according to a 'logic of appropriateness' rather than a 'logic of consequences'.5 
Humanitarianism, constructivists maintain, is a social and cultural norm which, over the years, has 
developed to a point where it may warrant armed intervention.  
 
Another approach to international relations draws on the ideas of Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci to 
understand the modern world order. Gramsci developed a concept of hegemony which consists of not 
only coercive power, by which an actor can force others to comply with his wishes, but also of 
constructing consensus on the existing social order. A number of international relations scholars, such as 
Robert Cox and Stephen Gill, have used Gramsci's concept of hegemony to understand the modern world 
order.6 The hegemon, in this case the United States and its allies, successfully propagates a world order 
comprising certain values, such as democracy and free trade, which most other states willingly comply 
with. If they fail to do so, the hegemon also possesses the material capabilities to bring them back into 
the fold. Neo-Gramscians agree with constructivists that norms and identities are essentially socially 
                                               
4 J. Ruggie, 'What makes the world hang together? Neo-utilitatarianism and the social-constructivist challenge' in: International 
organisation 52:4 (1998), 863 
5 M. Finnemore, National interests in international society (Ithaca 1996), 29 
6 R. Cox, 'Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory' in: Millennium – journal of international 
studies (1981), pp. 126-155 and 'Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method' in: Millennium – journal of 
international studies (1983), pp. 162-175 
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constructed. Both theories believe that there is a normative quality to state behaviour on the 
international scene. However, neo-Gramscian scholars trace everything back to material forces while 
constructivists are more interested in norms and ideas.  
 
The neo-Gramscian perspective has not previously been applied to humanitarian intervention, but it does 
not require a large leap of the imagination to do so. An important characteristic of hegemony is that it 
involves articulating and defending a coherent world view based on a set of values. These values may 
include democracy and free trade, which can be seen as having a direct connection to the economic 
power base of the hegemon, but also human rights if this helps to lend coherence to the world view that 
is being propagated.7 If the dominance of a state or an alliance of states relies on widespread acceptance 
of a set of values, any deviation from this presents a threat to the existing consensus and therefore the 
power base of the hegemon. In this situation, the use of coercive power may be warranted. From this 
perspective, the concept of universal human rights and the willingness to defend them with the use of 
military force can be regarded as an instrument of American or Western hegemony.  
 
Historians often shy away from the use of theory in their research. With Ranke, they aspire to describe 
only 'wie es eigentlich gewesen', or how it actually happened. This is a good guiding principle, but it does 
not always do justice to the complex nature of historical facts and the events they seek to describe. The 
British physicist Sir William Henry Bragg wrote that 'the most important thing in science is not so much to 
obtain new facts as to discover new ways of thinking about them.' The task of the historian, then, is not 
to present all the facts uncritically, leaving it to the reader to pass judgement on them, but to make 
sense of the facts by studying them from every possible angle. This is where theory come in useful. One 
theory will place more weight on certain facts than on others, and make connections that are not always 
visible to the plain eye. Comparing theoretical approaches means acknowledging that there are different 
angles to a story, that there is more than one way to look at the facts. This is especially crucial for a 
controversial issue like humanitarian intervention. Constructivism and neo-Gramscianism are well-
equipped to elucidate the role of values and norms in international politics, making these theories 
particularly relevant to the issue of humanitarian intervention.  
 
In order to really understand what happened in Kosovo, we need to not only study the facts, but also 
examine different ways of looking at them. It is to this end that I will compare and contrast constructivist 
and neo-Gramscian perspectives to answer the question: why did NATO intervene in Kosovo? As we have 
seen above, NATO defended its actions on both a legal and a moral basis and on the right to defend their 
own security interests. This being a historical study, we will not get into the question of legality except in 
so far as it relates to the other two arguments. The most salient issue, then, is to what extent NATO 
acted on humanitarian motives, and to what extent they acted on their own interests. Was there 
legitimacy to the claim that they acted on the basis of values and not just interests, and how do these 
relate to each other? What norms and values were articulated, and how did they influence the way the 
war was fought and presented? What was the role of human rights, and was this fundamentally changing, 
signalling a normative shift? And finally, since this is an exercise in the use of theory, an overarching 
question will be how convincing both of these theories are in explaining NATO's decision to intervene in 
                                               
7 M. Rupert, 'Alienation, capitalism and the inter-state system: towards a Marxian/Gramscian critique' in S. Gill, Gramsci, historical 
materialism and international relations (1993), 80 
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Kosovo. 
 
This paper covers NATO's intervention in Kosovo, but the main emphasis will be on the United States. 
There are several reasons for this. The US was unquestionably the most dominant member of NATO. It 
contributed by far the largest number of military assets to the bombing campaign. In addition to this, it 
exercised clear leadership within the alliance. As one scholar put it: 'where the United States does not 
tread, the allies do not follow.'8 NATO intervened in Kosovo because the US wanted it to, so in order to 
understand NATO's actions it makes sense to start with the US. The focus of my primary research is on 
public documents. I examine the official statements of the Clinton administration between January and 
June 1999, the period during which the Kosovo campaign was prepared and carried out. During this 
period, Kosovo was the subject of several presidential addresses and was discussed extensively in 
innumerable press briefings. In this way, the administration engaged in constant dialogue with the 
American public to explain and gain approval for their actions. This is useful for our purposes because 
values and norms are not constructed behind closed doors or in classified documents, they are articulated 
and debated in the public realm. The public discourse therefore reveals the normative context, the norms 
and values shared by the public and politicians. These primary documents will be supplemented by a 
large body of secondary literature which will be examined through the lens of the two theories. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The first chapter summarises the events surrounding the intervention 
in Kosovo based on the available secondary literature to establish the historical context. The second 
chapter opens with a more detailed discussion of constructivist theory to establish the framework from 
which to analyse the events. It then moves on to a closer examination of the official rhetoric of the 
Clinton administration on Kosovo. The third and final chapter will build on the findings of the 
constructivist analysis to examine what the neo-Gramscian perspective can add, again firstly by sketching 
the theoretical framework followed by an attempt to apply it to the case of Kosovo. The concluding 
chapter summarises the findings of this exercise and addresses the questions posed above. In addition to 
this, some remarks will be made on the utility of the two theories used for this paper and more generally 
on the use of theory in historical research.  
 
                                               
8 Charles Krauthammer, 'The unipolar moment' in: Foreign Affairs 70:1 (1991), 24 
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I. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo: historical overview 
 
The international community was relieved in 1995 when the Dayton Accords brought an end to years of 
bloody conflict in the Balkans. In Europe and the United States, politicians and the public alike hoped that 
the region would finally know lasting peace. Within a few years, however, these hopes were jeopardised 
by conflict in Kosovo. In 1998, violence erupted between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the 
Yugoslav armed forces. A year later, NATO launched an extensive air campaign against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia which ended in the withdrawal of Yugoslavian troops from Kosovo and the 
deployment of a peacekeeping force. What was the background to the violence in Kosovo? How and why 
did the international community, especially the US and NATO, become actively involved in the conflict? 
And how did the decision to launch air strikes against President Milosevic and his armed forces come 
about? These questions will be addressed in a historical overview of the crisis and international 
engagement with Kosovo, presented below.  
 
Background of the conflict 
Tensions between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo go back as far as 1912, when Serbia and Montenegro 
conquered Kosovo from the Ottoman Empire in the First Balkan War. As a result, the Albanian people that 
made up a small majority of the population of Kosovo became part of Serbia, and not of the newly 
independent Albania. During the Second World War, Kosovo was briefly united with Albania under Italian 
rule and large numbers of Kosovar Serbs were expelled. When the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
was declared in 1945, however, Kosovo once again became a constituent of Serbia. Albanian nationalism 
gained ground during the 1980s as the Yugoslav Federation weakened. By this time, Albanians 
constituted 90 percent of the population of the province. In 1989, Serbia abolished Kosovar autonomy. 
The Albanian population responded by setting up a shadow government. In a referendum held in 1991, 
nearly 100 percent of Kosovar Albanians supported independence. Nonetheless, Serbia, which 
traditionally considered Kosovo the 'cradle' of the Serbian nation, refused to relinquish control of the 
province.9  
 
Tension continued as the region was engulfed by war in the early 1990s. Yet Kosovo hardly figured in the 
Dayton Accords in 1995, which left Kosovar Albanians with the feeling that the international community 
had abandoned them.10 It is true that until 1998, the media and the public in Western countries paid very 
little attention to Kosovo. It was overshadowed by the bloody conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and the 
international diplomatic efforts to reach a peace settlement there. Western policymakers were aware of 
Kosovo but did not support independence like they had earlier for Slovenia and Croatia and eventually for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, instead presenting Kosovo as an internal problem of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.  During the Dayton peace talks, Western politicians refrained from putting 
Milosevic under pressure over Kosovo, fearing that this might jeopardise peace in Bosnia. Instead, they 
pursued a policy which Alex Bellamy has called malign non-engagement, which consisted of appeasing 
Milosevic and essentially sacrificing Kosovo to save Bosnia.11  
 
                                               
9 Marie-Janine Calic, 'Kosovo in the twentieth century: a historical account' in: Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur, Kosovo and the 
challenge of humanitarian intervention: selective indignation, collective action and international citizenship (2000), 19-23 
10 Ibid, 28 
11 Alex J. Bellamy, Kosovo and international society (2002), 66 
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This changed, however, in 1998. There were several reasons for this, both internal and external. Within 
Kosovo, exasperation with the lack of progress led to the formation of the KLA, a militant organisation 
which targeted Serbian authorities. In 1998, the Serbian government, in an effort to prevent further 
disintegration of the last remains of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, initiated a large-scale campaign 
against the KLA. In February, Serbian offensives against KLA strongholds left dozens of people dead, 
including a large number of civilians, women and children. The events immediately received high level 
attention in the US and Europe. The Contact Group which had monitored the situation in the Balkans 
since the early 1990s (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia and the US), immediately 
condemned the attack, demanded that Serbia withdrew its forces from Kosovo and enter into a dialogue 
with the Albanian population and that humanitarian organisations be allowed to enter Kosovo. This swift 
response reflected exasperation with Milosevic and a conviction that firm, rapid and united action was 
necessary to prevent more bloodshed like that seen in Bosnia.12  
 
Clinton administration officials were quick to condemn the violence in harsh terms. Secretary of State 
Madeline Albright stated that the United States would not 'stand by and watch Serb authorities do in 
Kosovo what they can no longer get away with in Bosnia.'13 This is curious, given the fact that Kosovo at 
this point had hardly registered in public opinion polls and the administration was embroiled in the 
Lewinsky affair.14 There are several possible explanations for this. One is that the second Clinton 
administration was more 'hawkish' than the first, with Madeline Albright replacing the more cautious 
Warren Christopher as Secretary of State and the similarly interventionist Richard Holbrooke appointed as 
ambassador to the UN.15 Another is that there was a changing perception of political necessity. When the 
Dayton Accords were signed, Western politicians were convinced that appeasing Milosevic was the key to 
peace and stability in the Balkans. As the years went by, however, it turned out that they had misjudged 
him. The violence that erupted in 1998 confirmed that peace could only come if Milosevic were firmly 
opposed. The turmoil in Kosovo represented a threat to the fragile stability of the entire region.16 As a 
result, in 1998 Kosovo quickly moved to the top of the agendas of Western leaders.  
 
Diplomacy backed by credible force 
For a full year, from the first outbreak of hostilities in Kosovo to the NATO air campaign, the United States 
and its European allies explored diplomatic solutions to the conflict. This policy was based on a number of 
considerations. For one thing, there was very little domestic appetite for a military intervention, especially 
in the United States, where Congress was critical of Clinton's foreign policy. Another issue was that there 
was no international consensus to lend legitimacy to NATO's action. The Security Council would never 
authorise a military intervention, because Russia and China would be sure to exercise their veto. 
Furthermore, a NATO intervention in the Balkan region was sure to antagonise Russia and endanger the 
fragile relationship which the US, NATO and the EU were building with that country. Finally, the NATO 
allies were divided amongst themselves on the question of whether it was necessary and legitimate to 
use force, and if so, what kind of force. NATO's actions, both in the diplomatic effort and in the bombing 
campaign which ensued, were clearly guided by these considerations.  
                                               
12 Ivo H. Daalder & Michael O'Hanlon, Winning ugly: NATO's war to save Kosovo (2000), 24-28 
13 Ibid, 24 
14 Robert C. DiPrizio, Armed humanitarians: US interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo (2002), 135 
15 Stephen Wertheim, 'A solution from hell: the US and the rise of humanitarian interventionism, 1991-2003 in: Journal of genocide 
research 12:3-4 (2010), 160 
16 Bellamy, Kosovo and international society, 67 
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President Clinton faced a hostile Congress when it came to his foreign policy objectives. With the end of 
the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet threat, many questioned the necessity of American 
commitment to Europe and the rest of the world. It was time for Europe, liberated from the Soviet threat 
and increasingly unified, to begin to pull its own weight. Even Henry Kissinger, while recognising that the 
conflict in Kosovo had the potential to destabilise the region, maintained that this was a European 
problem which did not threaten American interests.17 The limits of Congressional support for an armed 
intervention later became painfully clear when the bombing campaign did commence. A resolution to 
endorse the campaign was tied 213-213, while a resolution which refused funding for the commitment of 
ground troops was passed with 290-139 votes.18 The Clinton administration knew from the beginning that 
securing the support of Congress was going to be a difficult task, and that it would first have to show that 
it had exhausted all diplomatic options, as well as making a strong case for the necessity to act. 
 
In addition to this, it was clear from the beginning that a military intervention was unlikely to receive its 
mandate from the UN Security Council. Two of the five permanent members of the Security Council, 
Russia and China, were staunchly anti-interventionist and were sure to use their veto. This presented a 
problem for the US and their European allies. They had always attached great value to the UN as an 
instrument of international cooperation and consensus, but pushing this issue in the Security Council was 
was unlikely to be successful and sure to create division. Yet acting without consent could cause 
irreparable damage to the credibility of the Security Council. Either they could 'debilitate the organisation 
by trying but failing to use it. Or they could discredit the organisation by effectively ignoring it.'19 
Throughout 1998, the US and its allies chose the middle road. They worked through the Security Council 
to pass resolutions which condemned Serbian actions without authorising military action. But in their 
negotiations with Milosevic, they explicitly threatened military action if he did not comply with their 
demands.  
 
The decision to pursue a diplomatic solution to the conflict was also influenced by lack on consensus 
within the alliance. As we have seen, in the United States many believed that Kosovo was the 
responsibility of the Europeans. A number of European countries did try to take a leading role in 
coordinating the response to Milosevic's actions in Kosovo, most notably Great Britain, which adopted a 
tough stance in early 1998, and France, which had explored diplomatic avenues as early as 1997.20 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair was the first to openly threaten with the use of force, in June 1998. He 
did not have the support of his European allies, however. Belgium, France and Germany openly 
questioned the legality of such an intervention, while Greece, Italy and Spain opposed it for political 
reasons.21 For several European countries, especially France, an important priority was also not to 
antagonise Russia, which they believed to be central to European security. The European Union, 
meanwhile, was incapable of playing a meaningful role. It had no military capabilities and was still 
                                               
17 Charles A. Kupchan, 'Kosovo and the future of US engagement in Europe: continued hegemony or impending retrenchment?' in: 
Pierre Martin & Mark R. Brawley, Alliance politics, Kosovo and NATO's war: allied force or forced allies? (2000), 77 
18 Ibid, 76 
19 Alan K. Henrikson, 'The constraint of legitimacy: the legal and institutional framework of Euro-Atlantic security' in: Martin & 
Brawley, Alliance politics, 46 
20 Simon Duke, Hans-George Ehrhart and Matthias Karadi, 'The major European allies: France, Germany and the United Kingdom' in: 
Schnabel & Thakur, Kosovo and the challenge of humanitarian intervention, 129 
21 Bellamy, Kosovo and international society, 86 
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haunted by its failure to successfully address the conflict in Bosnia several years earlier.22 Whatever policy 
was pursued, therefore, was contingent on American leadership and would require a unified effort to 
forge consensus both within the alliance and outside it.  
 
The strategy which was adopted has been described as diplomacy backed by credible force. On 31 March 
1998, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States 
introduced a draft resolution to the Security Council which condemned the violence, demanded that both 
parties enter into negotiations, and introduced an arms embargo against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. The resolution appealed to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, by which it identified the situation 
as a threat to international peace and stability. Therefore, this was the first time that Kosovo was 
recognised as an international problem in its own right, rather than as an internal problem for Serbia.23 
Resolution 1160 was passed by 14 votes to 0, with China abstaining. Russia supported the resolution 'on 
the understanding that there was no threat to international peace and stability.'24  
 
During the summer of 1998, international pressure was relaxed somewhat. By all appearances, Milosevic 
was stepping down his campaign against Kosovo, and NATO governments did not want to be seen as 
fighting the KLA's war. They were still not in favour of independence for Kosovo, nor could they be seen 
to be supporting a group which, only a few months before, the US special envoy to the Balkans, Robert 
Gelbard, had labeled a terrorist group.25 In late July, however, Serbian troops launched another major 
offensive against the KLA, forcing 100,000 Kosovars to flee their homes. Against this background, 
resolution 1199 was introduced. It would take a full month before the Security Council succeeded in 
passing the resolution because Russia opposed any provisions that could imply the use of military force.26 
On September 23, the resolution was passed unanimously. Again, China abstained. Resolution 1199 was 
more firmly worded than resolution 1160 and blamed Milosevic and his government directly for the 
hostitilies, while reaffirming its commitment to the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, thereby opposing Kosovar independence.27  
 
Resolution 1199 stopped short of authorising the use of force if the warring parties failed to comply. 
Nonetheless, NATO soon began to threaten with air strikes unless Milosevic ended his campaign against 
Kosovo.28 Already in June, 80 NATO warplanes had participated in an exercise over Albanian and 
Macedonian territory to show that they could mobilise air power against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. On September 24, one day after resolution 1199 was passed, NATO issued an activation 
warning for both limited air strikes and a phased air campaign. NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana 
warned that after all these threats, NATO credibility was now on the line. Several days later, another 
massacre took place in the village of Gornji Obrinje which claimed the lives of 21 women, children and 
elderly people. In the West, these images conjured up memories of Bosnia several years earlier. Yet 
instead of exploring military options, the United States sent Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade to enter into 
                                               
22 Anne Deighton, 'The European Union and NATO's war over Kosovo: toward the glass ceiling?' in: Martin & Brawley, Alliance 
politics, 58 
23 Bellamy, Kosovo and international society, 76 
24 'Security Council imposes arms embargo on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' UN Press release SC/6496 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980331.SC6496.html 
25 'The KLA: terrorists or freedom fighters?' BBC June 28, 1998 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/121818.stm 
26 Daalder & O'Hanlon, Winning ugly, 40-42 
27 S/RES/1199, 23-09-1998 http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1199 
28 Henrikson, 'The constraint of legitimacy', 48 
  11 
negotiations with Milosevic.29  
 
Richard Holbrooke had been instrumental in negotiating the Dayton Accords and had first hand 
experience with dealing with Milosevic. Holbrooke reiterated NATO's threat of air strikes by having 
General Michael Short, who would be commanding the NATO operation, accompany him to Belgrade.30 
Various assessments of Holbrooke's mission have been offered, most of them influenced by the fact that 
it ultimately did not succeed in achieving a durable peace. Holbrooke did, however, succeed in obtaining a 
temporary cease-fire. Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and allow unarmed monitors 
into Kosovo to verify that he kept his word. In the short, term, with winter coming, this may have helped 
to prevent an acute humanitarian crisis. In the long run, however, it failed to solve the conflict and may 
have even made matters worse. Daalder & O'Hanlon believed Holbrooke's mission was little more than a 
way of delaying a difficult decision. It was 'one more indication that the aim was less to find a viable and 
lasting solution to the conflict than to push the final reckoning as far into the future as possible.'31 There 
were a number of reasons why the Clinton administration might have been eager to buy time. For one 
thing, they may have hoped that a costly armed conflict could still be avoided. In addition to this, in order 
to defend a military intervention, they would first have to be able to convince the public that all other 
options had been exhausted.  
 
The agreement brokered by Holbrooke did not provide a long respite. In December 1998, hostilities 
between the two parties resumed. On January 15, 1999, over 40 people were killed by Serbian armed 
forces in what appeared to have been a mass execution near the village of Racak. Serbian authorities 
claimed that the bodies belonged to KLA fighters who had been killed in combat. However, international 
observers and journalists who arrived the following day stated that most of the victims had been shot in 
the head or neck at close range, indicating that they had been executed.32 The Racak massacre, as it 
soon came to be called, provoked international outrage and increased calls for action in the United States 
and Europe. US President Bill Clinton and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana placed the blame for the 
killings on Serbian troops and promised that they would not tolerate such atrocities.33 
 
In a final effort to pursue a diplomatic solution to the conflict, all the parties involved were called to a 
conference at Rambouillet, near Paris, to negotiate an end to the fighting. The agreement that was 
drafted at Rambouillet preserved the territorial unity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia while restoring 
self-government to Kosovo. A NATO peacekeeping force numbering 30,000 troops would be deployed to 
Kosovo to ensure that both parties respected the terms of the agreement. Marc Weller, who was present 
at the conference as legal advisor to the Kosovo delegation, reported that the Yugoslav delegation barely 
participated in the initial talks but was in the end presented with a draft that was considerably more 
favourable for them than the initial text. Nonetheless, only the Kosovar delegation ultimately accepted 
the agreement, while the Yugoslav delegation refused to sign.34 With the failure of the Rambouillet 
Conference, a military response from NATO was now imminent. International monitors began to withdraw 
from Kosovo in anticipation of air strikes. Meanwhile, the Serbian armed forces launched a large-scale 
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campaign of ethnic cleansing.35  
 
Was the Rambouillet Conference bound to fail? Some have argued that the terms presented at 
Rambouillet were impossible to accept for the Yugoslav delegation. As the leader of a sovereign nation, 
Milosevic could not possibly agree to 30,000 NATO troops being deployed on his territory, even if their 
only function was peacekeeping. While Kosovo would legally remain part of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, in practice it would mean yielding control of the province for years to come. For the Kosovar 
delegation, meanwhile, dropping the demand for independence was a huge concession. Perhaps the 
differences were simply too great. But if this was the case, why embark on negotiations in the first place? 
Daalder and O'Hanlon argued that the Rambouillet conference served one important purpose: to 'signal 
the end of the diplomatic road' and justify a resort to military means. They quote Sandy Berger as saying 
that 'we needed to demonstrate a real commitment to get a peaceful resolution in order to get the allies 
to go along with the use of significant force.' Likewise, an aide to Albright claimed that the purpose of the 
negotiations was 'to get the war started with the Europeans locked in.'36 Bellamy disagrees with this 
assessment, stating that it was not the failure of the Rambouillet conference that finally convinced NATO 
to take action, but the campaign of ethnic cleansing that immediately followed it.37  
 
Whichever factor was decisive, it was clear by the end of March 1999 that all diplomatic options had been 
exhausted. On the whole, the various diplomatic efforts that were undertaken to resolve the conflict do 
demonstrate the reluctance of NATO to address the conflict by means of force. The threat of force was 
used as a weapon to force the parties to negotiate but the credibility of this threat was undermined by 
NATO's obvious hesitance to act on it. As we have seen, this hesitance was caused by a number of 
factors, especially the lack of domestic, international and intra-alliance consensus. In the end, however, 
as Javier Solana observed, NATO's credibility would have been seriously undermined if its threats turned 
out to be an empty shell.  
 
Operation Allied Force 
On March 24, 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It 
was 6 days after the failure of the Rambouillet Conference. NATO leaders anticipated a short bombing 
campaign, believing that Milosevic would soon cave to the pressure. This proved to be a misjudgment, 
however, and it was not until June 10 that the campaign was suspended, after Milosevic accepted a 
cease-fire broadly based on the terms which had been negotiated at Rambouillet.  
 
The NATO governments justified their resort to force in a number of ways. Firstly, it was aimed at 
averting a humanitarian disaster. Secondly, the credibility of NATO was at stake. Thirdly, it would be 
immoral to stand by while ethnic cleansing was taking place on the doorstep of civilised Europe. And 
finally, resolutions 1160 and 1199 legitimised an armed intervention.38 The issue of legitimacy is 
important because it reflects on all the key obstacles identified earlier in this chapter: the need to achieve 
international consensus, to convince the public at home and to keep the alliance together. Even though 
neither resolution 1160 nor resolution 1199 explicitly authorised the use of force against Milosevic, 
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members of NATO, with Great Britain in the lead, argued that these resolutions and the escalation of 
violence in Kosovo constituted grounds for military action. Russia and a number of other countries 
protested but did not succeed in getting support for a resolution condemning NATO's actions.39  
 
The philosophical basis for humanitarian intervention originated in Augustine's 'Just War' principle and 
Thomas Aquinas' insistence that war is just when it is waged for the sake of doing good. The legal basis 
for humanitarian intervention can be traced back to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
Genocide Convention, both adopted by the UN in 1948, and Chapter VII of the UN charter, which gives 
the Security Council the ability to sanction the use of force in situations which constitute a threat to 
international peace and security. During the 1990s, the Security Council increasingly invoked Chapter VII 
in response to humanitarian crises.40 The British argued that earlier interventions in Somalia and Bosnia 
constituted a precedent for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, even without explicit Security Council 
authorisation. The criteria for such an intervention were that there was convincing evidence of a severe 
humanitarian crisis, that there was no alternative to the use of force, and that the means chosen 
corresponded to the humanitarian objectives.41 For the international audience, NATO maintained that its 
actions were legitimate because they were based on humanitarian grounds, and refuted accusations that 
their actions were illegal because they did not have explicit Security Council authorisation. On the other 
side, critics of NATO maintained that its violation of state sovereignty was an inexcusable breach of 
international law. The general consensus in the academic world is that NATO's actions cannot be justified 
in legal terms, but many have nonetheless agreed that there were moral grounds to act, concluding that 
the intervention was 'illegal but legitimate.'42  
 
How convincing was the argument that humanitarian concerns constituted the basis for NATO's actions? 
Many observers have been skeptical about NATO's humanitarian motives. Critics pointed out that there 
were plenty of instances of more severe atrocities against civilians which were left unpunished by NATO.43 
It is true that the number of victims was low compared to earlier humanitarian crises in, for example, 
Rwanda and Bosnia. By March 1999, only 2000 had been killed. In addition to this, President Clinton's 
previous responses to the crises in Rwanda, Bosnia and Haiti did not give the impression that he was 
particularly concerned with human rights.44 However, this argument neglects the hundreds of thousands 
of Kosovars that had been displaced and the fact that Milosevic had a clear record of violence in Bosnia. 
Adam Roberts believed that it was precisely the previous failures to stand up to humanitarian crises that 
motivated them to act resolutely in Kosovo. 'The NATO states were united by a sense of shame that in 
the first four years of atrocious wars in the Balkans, they had failed, individually and collectively, to 
devise coherent policies and to engage in decisive actions.'45 This collective experience convinced NATO 
leaders that in Kosovo, they would have to act quickly and decisively, and do so together, to prevent a 
disaster like Bosnia from happening again. 
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The humanitarian argument was both strengthened and weakened by the fact that the conflict in Kosovo 
immediately escalated when the bombing began. Western intelligence agencies had warned for some 
time that in the short-term, bombing Milosevic might just cause him to step up his campaign against the 
Kosovars.46 On the other hand, there were rumours that Milosevic was already planning a massive 
campaign called 'Operation Horseshoe' which would encircle Kosovo and drive the Kosovar Albanians out. 
By acting quickly, NATO leaders argued, they could strike at Milosevic's armed forces and weaken their 
ability to wage war.47 While it is true that the air strikes escalated the conflict on the ground in the short 
term, there is no way of knowing what would have happened or how many would have died if NATO had 
stood aside and let the events unfold.  
 
The humanitarian motive was also undermined by the decision to rely on air power only. Much has been 
written about this decision, about the underlying reasons and about the degree to which it was 
successful. From the very beginning, President Clinton explicitly ruled out the use of ground troops. In 
addition to this, NATO planes were to fly at altitudes no lower than 15,000 feet to avoid Serbian air 
defenses. The idea that air strikes would be sufficient to force Milosevic to re-open negotations was based 
on the success of Operation Deliberate Force in 1995, which ultimately led to the Dayton Accords.48 It has 
even been suggested that the reason NATO intervened in Kosovo was precisely because they believed it 
could be done using air power alone, making the costs reasonable.49 Relying on air power meant that 
they could avoid the costs and risks involved in committing ground troops. Such an undertaking could 
seriously undermine domestic support for the operation as well as the unity of the alliance, since most 
members were reluctant to say the least to commit ground troops to Kosovo.50 
 
However, the limits of the air campaign soon became apparent. Rather than bending to the pressure after 
a few days of being bombed, as NATO expected, Milosevic only hardened his resolve. NATO commanders 
did not have a plan B in case the chosen tactic did not work. As the bombing started, the Serbian armed 
forces intensified their attacks on Kosovo. Hampered by bad weather and forced to fly at high altitudes, 
NATO pilots were powerless to influence the situation on the ground. In addition to this, the impact of the 
bombing was limited by a strong desire on the part of the alliance to prevent collateral damage and 
civilian casualties, as this was sure to undermine domestic support for the war. As a result, the first 
month of bombing was largely ineffectual. Instead of putting Milosevic and his government under 
pressure, the bombing initially appeared to solidify his position in Serbia.51  
 
The effectiveness of the air campaign increased after the first month, with the help of improved weather 
conditions and an expansion of targets. Yet after two months of bombing, it was not clear that Milosevic 
was any closer to giving in to NATO's demands. In this context, a growing number of people questioned 
whether air power was really sufficient to do the job. British Prime Minister Tony Blair again took the lead 
in advocating a change in tactics. On May 27, British Defense Minister George Robertson met with his 
French, Italian, German and American counterparts to discuss the possibility of sending ground forces to 
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Kosovo. He pledged 54,000 British troops to such an effort. At this meeting, France and Italy also agreed 
to commit troops, though not so many, if an invasion did take place. Germany and the United States did 
not commit at this time. On June 2, Sandy Berger wrote a memo to President Clinton in which he stated 
that the only viable option left was to stage a ground invasion. According to some inside sources, Clinton 
agreed with this assessment and was prepared to commit ground troops.52  
 
The invasion never came, however, because on June 3, Milosevic and the Yugoslavian parliament 
accepted a cease-fire. It remains to determine whether NATO was really going to follow through on its 
threat, or whether it was only intended to sway Milosevic. There were many difficulties with committing 
ground troops. It was estimated that 200,000 troops would be necessary to launch an invasion of 
Yugoslavia. Mobilising such a force would take months, and no logistical preparations had as of yet been 
made. In addition to this, there was no agreement within the alliance on the necessity of launching a full-
scale invasion.53 The British pledge of 50,000 troops was intended to lower the threshold for the other 
allies, especially the US, which would have to commit the largest share of forces. The biggest obstacle to 
sending ground forces was what has been called the 'body bag syndrome.' If American soldiers were to 
return from a distant conflict in body bags, this would be sure to conjure up images of Vietnam and 
greatly undermine public support for the war.54 On the other hand, as mentioned before, NATO could not 
afford to lose face over Kosovo. If air power proved insufficient to defeat Milosevic, eventually other 
options would have to be considered.  
 
So did air power win the war? In the end, the tactics chosen did prove to be sufficient to bring Milosevic 
to his knees. However, other factors certainly contributed to the decision to accept a cease-fire. One was 
that NATO was evidently beginning to seriously consider the option of sending ground troops to Kosovo. 
Whether this threat was really credible at this stage is a matter of some discussion, but it was one that 
Milosevic certainly could not ignore. In addition to this, the situation on the ground in Kosovo was 
changing. A KLA offensive forced Serbian troops to concentrate, making them easier targets for NATO 
planes.55 As a result, the Serbians were losing their strategic advantage. Rather than running the risk of 
being humiliatingly defeated by NATO and the KLA, Milosevic chose to accept a cease-fire.  
 
It is also important not to underestimate the role of Russia. Although it had publicly condemned NATO's 
threat to intervene from the very beginning, Russia did vote for resolutions 1160 and 1199, unlike China 
which chose to abstain. The Russians were eager not to be isolated within the Security Council and hoped 
that these resolutions would serve as a final deterrent to Milosevic. In October 1998, Russian Foreign 
Minister Igor Ivanov reportedly told his British and American counterparts Robin Cook and Madeline 
Albright that if they took the Kosovo matter to the Security Council, Russia would be forced to veto it, but 
if they did not, Russia would just denounce it.56 Again eager to avoid international isolation, Russian 
efforts were then directed at playing a major role in the peace settlement between NATO and Milosevic, 
and ensuring that there would be a Russian contingent in the peacekeeping force that was to be 
deployed. On June 12, 1999, the 'dash to Pristina', which saw Russian troops occupying Pristina airport 
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before any NATO troops could be deployed, was probably intended to create a fait accompli to ensure that 
Russia would not be excluded from the peacekeeping effort. In any case, Russia's decision not to support 
Milosevic was a crucial element in bringing about a cease-fire.57  
 
Conclusion 
On June 10, the North Atlantic Council ratified the cease-fire agreement with Milosevic and the air 
campaign was suspended. Two days later, a NATO-led peacekeeping force entered Kosovo. The Kosovo 
Force (KFOR) included American, British, French German and Italian troops as well as a Russian 
contingent. President Clinton was exuberant, stating that from now on, 'if somebody comes after innocent 
civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, 
and it’s within our power to stop it, we will stop it.'58 
 
The reason the international community did not pay much attention to Kosovo before 1998 was that it 
was considered an internal problem of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was overshadowed by much 
bloodier conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. During the negotiations for the Dayton Accords, western leaders 
considered Kosovo a concession that had to be made in order to achieve peace in Bosnia. In 1998, it 
became clear that appeasement had failed to bring peace to the region. The conflict in Kosovo threatened 
to escalate and many feared that it would spill over into neighboring countries, plunging the Balkans back 
into war. There was a sense of exasperation with Milosevic and his actions. Instability in the Balkans, 
strategically placed on the frontier between Europe and the Middle East, was perceived to threaten 
European security interests. 
 
However, the reasons for international engagement with Kosovo should not just be sought within the 
country itself. There were a number of external factors at work. For one thing, the 1990s brought 
increasing international attention to the issue of human rights. From the failed intervention in Somalia, to 
general inaction in the face of genocide in Rwanda, to NATO's involvement in Bosnia, the international 
community was continually debating how it should act in the face of humanitarian crises. By the end of 
the 1990s, there was growing consensus in Europe and the United States on humanitarian norms and the 
legitimacy of using armed force to defend them. This conviction was accompanied by a more confident 
second term Clinton administration, with Madeline Albright leading the way towards a more 
interventionist United States.  
 
Despite all of this, it would take a year before NATO decided to intervene with military force. The reasons 
for this can be traced back to the need to achieve domestic, international and intra-alliance consensus on 
the necessity to intervene and the means chosen. Here again, we see an interplay between internal and 
external factors. On the international scene, the NATO pursued a number of diplomatic options to bring 
about a solution to the conflict, knowing that an armed intervention would lead to serious resistance from 
countries like Russia and China as well as opposition at home. However, their efforts were overtaken by 
events within Kosovo itself, with especially the Racak massacre propelling the US and Europe towards 
more forceful action. Even then, NATO chose to stage a limited intervention, consisting only of air strikes. 
                                               
57 Ibid, 103-105 
58 Speech by Bill Clinton to KFOR Troops in Macedonia, 22 June 1999 http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/Europe-
9906/html/Speeches/990622d.html 
  17 
This decision was necessary to appease the domestic audience, which would not have responded well to 
the image of soldiers returning in bodybags, and to preserve the unity of the alliance, which contained 
many opposing views on how best to respond to the crisis.  
 
A historical overview like the one presented here goes a long way towards describing and explaining how 
and why NATO decided to intervene in Kosovo. However, the challenge lies not only in presenting the 
facts, but also in interpreting them. The following chapters will explore constructivist and Gramscian 
approaches and attempt to determine their value in helping us to understand the events. 
  18 
II. Norms, identities and interests: a constructivist perspective 
 
In order to better understand how and why NATO decided to intervene in Kosovo, this chapter will 
examine the events described above from a constructivist perspective. In the first part of the chapter, a 
number of important constructivist scholars will be introduced to give an overview of the main 
constructivist claims, as well as relating them to the issue of humanitarian intervention. The second part 
will go on to apply these to the case of Kosovo. This involves a study of the official statements by the 
Clinton administration and a discussion of what this reveals about the decision to go to war. Special 
attention will be paid to what norms and values were articulated, and how these were related to national 
interests. We will consider the social and cultural basis of both norms and interests and attempt to 
discover to what extent the intervention Kosovo represented a normative shift.  
 
Constructivism and the issue of humanitarian intervention 
Constructivism, at its core, is interested in the intersubjective dimension of human action. Max Weber 
wrote: 'we are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude 
towards the world and to lend it significance.' This results in social facts, facts that do not exist in the 
material world, and which 'depend on human agreement that they exist and typically require human 
institutions for their existence.'59 Therefore, constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in 
international life. Constructivists identify a number of shortcomings in the rationalist narrative: it treats 
identities and interests as given, it fails to consider how identities shape interests or account for changing 
identities of states and it neglects normative factors in shaping states' identities.60 Constructivism seeks 
to address these questions by examining how identities and interests are constructed in the social realm. 
A central claim of constructivism is that beliefs or convictions have causal power instead of simply acting 
as 'theoretical fillers' or window dressing to justify foreign policy decisions. The behaviour of states is not 
just determined by material factors, but ideational factors also have causal and normative significance.61  
 
If identities and interests are not given, where do they come from? Constructivists believe that identities 
and interests are socially constructed, rather than given by nature. Martha Finnemore states that 'much 
of international politics is about defining rather than defending national interests.'62 States, like 
individuals, are embedded in social structures which define their identities. Likewise, interests are 
constructed by social interaction and 'defined in the context of internationally held norms and 
understanding about what is good and appropriate.'63 The international system therefore does have 
causal power, but this is not, as neo-realists claim, because of its inherent anarchy but because it is the 
realm where norms, values and interests are constituted. Finnemore is particularly interested in norms. 
By definition, norms exist in the public realm, they are often a subject of discussion and they always have 
behavioural consequences. Interests are shaped in part by norms.64  
 
Alexander Wendt, one of the most influential constructivists, explains that since states are social actors, 
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they act according to the (collective) meanings they attach to objects. Therefore threats and interests are 
essentially constructed, not given by nature. For this reason, Wendt argues, British nuclear weapons are 
less threatening to the US than Soviet ones.65 Despite the fact that they are constructed, the social 
structures that make up the international order are not necessarily dynamic. This is because firstly, social 
facts are presented as objective facts, and secondly, actors may find it in their interest to maintain 
relatively stable role identities. As a result, the international order is relatively stable despite there being 
no overarching authority and no objectively defined identities and interests.66  
 
Wendt's perspective is important because it allows us to look at classic security issues and identify the 
social processes at work. In humanitarian intervention, or any case of armed intervention, states are 
undeniably the most important players. This is because it conflicts directly with one of the most basic 
assumptions of the international order, which Wendt would call an institution and Finnemore a norm: 
state sovereignty. Indeed, one of the fundamental facts about humanitarian intervention is that it 
represents a conflict between two powerful norms: state sovereignty and human rights. It poses the 
philosophical question of whether an individual has rights that transcend state boundaries (universal 
human rights), or whether his rights exist only by virtue of his belonging to a certain state. States might 
agree to set aside the fundamental notion of state sovereignty if they believe there to be legitimate 
reasons to do so. This introduces another fundamental element of international order: the notion of 
legitimacy.  
 
Ian Hurd has studied the concept of legitimacy in relation to states' compliance with international norms 
and rules. He challenges the notion that coercion and self-interest are the only good reasons for a state 
to comply to international rules and norms, instead arguing that states may choose to do so because 
they genuinely believe the rules and norms to be legitimate. He quotes Mark Suchman who wrote that 
legitimacy is 'a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.'67 To 
demonstrate this, Hurd examines the notion of state sovereignty and non-intervention. He notes that 
most of the world's borders are undefended and unchallenged, and that sovereignty is taken for granted 
by most states. He argues that the vast majority of states accept sovereignty, for themselves, but also 
for others, as a legitimate institution, a norm which has been so internalised that it is hardly a subject of 
discussion.68 Even so, state sovereignty is not a given but a product of social construction in a normative 
international context. If the notion of sovereignty has this degree of legitimacy based on shared ideas 
and understandings, other institutions or norms like human rights might have the same potential. The 
process of deciding whether a norm is legitimate is one of intersubjective understandings and 
convergence of certain beliefs. By this logic, one norm can prevail over another norm if the actors 
involved come to see it as more legitimate. This gives rise to the possibility that the basic rules and 
agreements that make up the international system can gradually change over time.  
 
The construction and proliferation of norms gives rise to a norm life cycle. In their article 'International 
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norm dynamics and political change,' Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink describe this cycle. The first 
stage is 'norm emergence,' where a new norm (such as the right for women to vote or the abolition of 
slavery) is pioneered by a number of 'norm entrepreneurs' and organisational platforms. The second 
stage is 'norm cascade', the point at which the norm gains the support of a large part of the public and 
powerful state and non-state actors. The third stage is 'internalisation', by which the norm becomes so 
widely accepted and institutionalised that actors hardly consider non-conformity. This final stage is where 
the norm is at its most powerful, but also difficult to identify because it is rarely articulated.69 This echoes 
the Gramscian concept of hegemony, by which power relies on consensus or unspoken agreement with a 
certain social order.  
 
The emergence of a norm is not always the result of a conscious campaign as described above. Some 
may evolve spontaneously or as a collateral to other political or cultural developments. What is important 
is that the construction and promotion of norms is a social practice. Peter Katzenstein notes: 'self-
reflection does not occur in isolation, it is communicated to others. (…) State interests and strategies are 
shaped by a never-ending political process that generates publicly understood standards for action.'70 
States are social actors that act according to a broadly defined and understood set of values and 
standards of appropriateness. Even their perception of objective interests can be traced back to social 
facts. This is true for the domestic realm as well as in the international system.  
 
As we have seen, the most important constructivist claim is that state behaviour, including perceptions of 
threats and interests, is defined by identity, which in turn can be traced back to social and cultural facts. 
This means that norms and beliefs influence how states act. Given the importance of norms and values in 
the debate about human rights and humanitarian intervention, it is worth examining this claim in more 
detail. Constructivists have identified a number of ways in which norms determine state behaviour. The 
first is where states act directly on their beliefs of what constitutes appropriate behaviour. The other two 
relate to how norms define the context and set the parameters for state behaviour on both the domestic 
and the international scene.  
 
Martha Finnemore defends the claim that states act not only on interests but also on beliefs about 
standards of appropriate behaviour. She illustrates her case with a number of examples, one of which is 
the origins of the Geneva convention and the establishment of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross in nineteenth century Europe. The Geneva Convention and the ICRC originated in the work of a few 
committed individuals, all of them non-state actors, who succeeded in putting humanitarian norms on the 
international political agenda. States had no particular material interest in regulating the way wounded 
enemy soldiers were treated during war. But they did adopt these humanitarian norms, not because it 
was in their interest to do so, but because they believed it was the right thing to do.71 This line of 
reasoning could be applied to other instances where humanitarian motives are involved. The attribution 
of direct causal power to norms is significant because it opposes the realist narrative which would state 
that norms are of secondary if any importance because states primarily act to defend their own interests. 
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Where norms are articulated, realist scholars would always seek to identify the material motives, like 
geopolitical or strategic interests, that underlie them. In response to the example given above, skeptics 
might argue that states may have acted on humanitarian motives in a situation where they had nothing 
to gain in terms of material interests, but they certainly wouldn't have done so if they had anything to 
lose. In other words, norms can motivate states, but if a conflict between norms and interests arises, 
interests will always come out on top.  
 
Constructivists respond to these criticisms in two different ways. To those that say that norms are nothing 
but a guise for more material motives, constructivists would respond that even then, the fact that norms 
are articulated and used to lend legitimacy to certain actions, demonstrates that norms do matter. The 
fact that norms are used to justify military action reveals the normative context, the values shared 
among politicians and the public. This sets the parameters for how politicians can and cannot act and 
shapes conceptions of interests. In the current international system, humanitarian norms are permissive 
in the sense that they make armed intervention on humanitarian grounds possible but do not require it in 
any given situation. If moral motives are used to justify a decision, the question to ask is whether that 
decision would have been made in the absence of credible moral motives. Norms are strengthened by 
institutionalisation, such as international agreements like the Geneva Convention and organisations like 
the United Nations. Multilateral consensus is an important prerequisite for a norm to be effective, because 
the construction and proliferation of norms is a social process.72  
 
There is another way in which the articulation of norms can be said to have causal impact on a state's 
actions. It boils down to the idea that, once articulated as a cause for action, an actor's professed 
motives acquire a reality of their own. This argument was made most eloquently by Quentin Skinner in 
his 1974 article 'Some problems in the analysis of political thought and action.' He stated that when an 
actor professes certain motives for action, he must align his actions to be compatible with those motives. 
'Even if the agent is not in fact motivated by any of the principles he professes, he will nevertheless be 
obliged to behave in such a way that his actions remain compatible with the claim that these principles 
genuinely motivated him.'73 Additionally, when a political actor seeks to legitimise an action that would 
generally be considered illegitimate or immoral, he will try to adapt the normative context to correspond 
to his actions. If he succeeds in doing so, the 'innovative ideologist', as Skinner calls him, sets a 
precedent for other such actions.74 In the discussion on humanitarian intervention, legal scholars often 
seek to determine whether an event like the intervention in Kosovo sets a legal precedent for other such 
interventions. However, the same argument can be made in a political context. If an actor succeeds in 
portraying his actions as legitimate, he makes the normative context more conducive to other such 
actions.  
 
To sum up: constructivists believe that state identities and interests are not given, that they are socially 
constructed, that norms do matter and that states can act out of ideational or altruistic motives. Interests 
are not only defined by material facts but also by social facts. In fact, foreign policy decision making is 
more about defining national interests than about defending them. Furthermore, states act on certain 
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rules and norms which they believe to be legitimate even if it is not in their direct (material) interest to 
do so. These are important observations that can shed light on some of the key issues surrounding 
human rights and humanitarian intervention, particularly in helping us to understand the motives of 
states and the normative considerations which influence the decision of whether or nor to intervene in a 
conflict.  
 
A constructivist perspective on Kosovo 
The following section will apply constructivist insights to the decision to go to war over Kosovo. As will be 
clear from the above, constructivists are less interested in what goes on behind closed doors and more in 
the social processes that determine state behaviour. By definition, norms require broad consensus, which 
means that they are formulated and debated in the public realm. It makes sense, therefore, to study the 
official rhetoric of the Clinton administration to discover the normative context within which they 
operated. This includes all documents issued by the Office of the Press Secretary: Presidential (radio) 
addresses, remarks at public occasions, joint statements with other heads of state, fact sheets, letters to 
Congress, press conferences held by the President, his Press Secretary Joe Lockhart and senior members 
of the administration. These most notably include Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Hugh Shelton. After offering an overview of the Clinton administration's rhetoric on Kosovo, 
we will proceed to analyse the claims that were made about the reasons to go to war. In particular, we 
will focus on how the national interest was presented and how humanitarian concerns figured in this 
narrative. The final section attempts to trace this narrative back to social facts and processes to 
understand how the decision to intervene was influenced by norms, values and ideas.  
 
The Clinton administration's rhetoric on Kosovo 
As we have seen, the White House had been engaging with Kosovo since early 1998. Public attention, 
however, was focused elsewhere. In the first weeks of 1999, Kosovo hardly figured in the official 
communications of the White House. The Press Secretary's daily press briefings were dominated by 
President Clinton's impeachment trials. Official statements tried to draw attention to domestic issues, like 
the budget surplus, environmental initiatives and education. When foreign policy did come up, it was 
mostly in relation to the no-fly zones in Iraq. Kosovo began to receive more attention after the Racak 
massacre on January 15, including a brief mention in the President's State of the Union address on 
January 19.75 However, it would take another month before the White House began to pay serious 
attention to the issue in its official communications. On February 12, Clinton was acquitted from 
impeachment by the Senate. The following day, he held a radio address to the nation explaining the 
situation in Kosovo and the need for US engagement with the conflict.76 It is easy to construe this as a 
conscious effort to divert attention away from the impeachment trials which had dominated the news 
cycles during the previous months, but we must also keep in mind that by this time, the talks at 
Rambouillet were under way and NATO was under increasing pressure to maintain its credibility.  
 
By the end of March, when it became clear that the negotiations at Rambouillet and Paris had failed, 
Kosovo began to dominate both the White House communications and the questions asked by reporters 
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at press briefings. On March 24, Clinton announced that NATO had commenced air strikes against Serbian 
military targets and explained why it was in the interest of the US to do so, something he would continue 
to do over the following months. From the sheer volume of public statements on Kosovo, by the 
President, the First Lady as well as Albright, Berger and Cohen, it is clear that the administration pursued 
a conscious campaign to win public support for its actions. What is striking is that in arguing why it was 
necessary to intervene, they did not present strategic concerns and humanitarian motives as two 
contradictory motives. Instead, the Clinton administration emphasised that both of these matters were 
closely related.  
 
The main message that comes through in all of these statements is that the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo 
constituted a very real threat to the vital national interests of the United States. Ending these human 
rights abuses and bringing peace to the Balkans was not only a moral imperative, it was also in the 
strategic interest. As Clinton stated, 'it is the right thing to do. It is also the smart thing to do, very much 
in our national interest.'77 On February 26, 1999, the President gave a speech, dubbed by Sandy Berger  
'the State of the Union for foreign policy.'78 Drawing on the experiences of the First and Second World 
Wars, he made a strong plea for American engagement with the rest of the world, and especially with 
Europe. Referring to distant conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere, he stated:  
 
'The true measure of our interests lies not in how small or distant these places are, or in 
whether we have trouble pronouncing their names. The question we must ask is, what 
are the consequences to our security of letting conflicts fester and spread. We cannot, 
indeed, we should not, do everything or be everywhere. But where our values and our 
interests are at stake, and where we can make a difference, we must be prepared to do 
so. And we must remember that the real challenge of foreign policy is to deal with 
problems before they harm our national interests.'79 
 
With these words, Clinton essentially outlined his main reasons for engaging in the conflict in Kosovo. He 
emphasised that the first precondition for sending American troops into war is that American interests are 
at stake, the second that American values are threatened, and finally that the US possesses the 
capabilities necessary to end the conflict. However, he fails to specify which interests are at stake. Nor 
does he define what values are worth fighting for. As for the issue of capabilities, there is no discussion of 
what the war was allowed to cost and how many American lives were worth risking to 'make a difference.' 
It is significant that Clinton brings together values and interests, but his choice of words leaves both of 
these categories wide open to interpretation.  
 
So how did the crisis in Kosovo threaten American national interests? In his March 24 speech announcing 
the beginning of the bombing campaign, Clinton pointed out the strategic location of Kosovo on the 
faultline between Christian and Islamic civilisations and in a region still recovering from years of ethnic 
conflict. A conflict in Kosovo would have 'no natural national boundaries' and could easily spill over into 
the volatile region. Furthermore, refugee flows into Macedonia and Albania were already beginning to 
                                               
77 'Remarks by the President on the situation in Kosovo' March 22, 1999 
78 'Press briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger' February 26, 1999 
79 'Remarks by the President on Foreign policy' February 26, 1999 
  24 
destabilise these countries. To top it off, the President pointed out that this was the region where World 
War I began, which was engulfed by World War II and which had seen bitter fighting and ethnic cleansing 
in the previous years. Again drawing a parallel to the earlier European wars of the twentieth century, he 
stated that failing to act now would make action more costly later. History had shown that 'if America is 
going to be prosperous and secure, we need a Europe that is prosperous, secure, undivided and free.' 
The Clinton administration acted because 'we care about saving innocent lives; because we have an 
interest in avoiding an even crueller and costlier war; and because our children need and deserve a 
peaceful, stable, free Europe.'80 
 
White House rhetoric on Kosovo contained repeated references to World War II and the Holocaust. On 
April 12, during the 7th Millennium evening entitled 'The perils of indifference: lessons learned from a 
violent century', the President, the First Lady and Elie Wiesel drew direct parallels between the Holocaust 
and what was happening in Kosovo. The President stated that 'when we see people forced from their 
homes at gunpoint, loaded onto train cars, their identity papers confiscated, their very presence blotted 
from the historical record, it is only natural that we would think of the events which Elie has chronicled 
tonight in his own life [the Holocaust].' But this time, the US would not stand by while the horrors 
unfolded.81 Likewise, the more recent events in Bosnia were referenced to draw attention to Milosevic's 
previous record of violence as well as NATO's success in stopping him.82 Sometimes explicit comparisons 
were made, but often just the mention of mass graves or of people being deported in train cars was 
enough to evoke memories of the Holocaust and Bosnia. These images were familiar to the American 
public. The Holocaust still serves as the ultimate example of evil and the failure of the world to stand up 
to it. Putting the conflict in Kosovo in these terms made it difficult for critics to refute the argument that 
the United States had a moral responsibility to act. 
 
In a press conference on March 25, 1999, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger addressed questions on 
the legitimacy of NATO's actions. Among other things, he addressed the criticism that NATO acted without 
a clear UN mandate, by claiming that Security Council resolutions 1199 and 1203 spoke out clearly on 
the issue of Kosovo. However, he went on to say that NATO reserved the right to act without explicit UN 
approval in situations which posed a threat to its stability and security.83 Berger was also asked whether 
NATO's actions established a precedent for humanitarian interventions. He responded that each situation 
should be assessed on its own merits, but that, given his previous actions in Croatia and Bosnia, for 
Milosevic to invoke the right to sovereignty was 'rather a weak argument.'84 This echoes an observation 
that many scholars of humanitarian intervention have made: that states may forfeit the fundamental 
right of sovereignty when they engage is massive human rights abuses against their own population.85 In 
defending the legitimacy of NATO's actions, then, the National Security Advisor appealed both to the right 
to act unilaterally where vital national interests are at stake, and to the moral argument that the norm of 
state sovereignty is subordinate to the norm of universal human rights.  
 
In press briefings, reporters repeatedly questioned the decision to limit the campaign to air strikes. From 
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the very beginning, President Clinton and his aides stressed that they had no intention of putting ground 
troops in a combat situation. Ground troops would only be used in a 'permissive environment', in other 
words, if Milosevic agreed to allow NATO troops into Kosovo for peacekeeping purposes. The air campaign 
was intended to persuade him to do so. However, many questioned whether air strikes would be sufficient 
to achieve the administration's stated objectives: to protect the Kosovars from Serbian aggression and 
restore the autonomy of Kosovo. Press Secretary Joe Lockhart repeatedly evaded questions to this effect, 
stating that the administration believed air strikes to be sufficient to achieve the military objectives, 
which were to limit Milosevic's ability to wage war on the Kosovar people and declining to comment on 
military operations.86 One reporter concluded that a disjuncture existed between the administration's 
portrayal of the war as a 'battle between dictatorship and democracy, a battle between good and evil, 
that the future of Europe is at stake, etc' and its 'extraordinary aversion to risk.'87 This is a disjuncture 
which will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
While the press briefings were dominated by questions on the military campaign and its objectives, a 
large number of official statements and communiques focused on humanitarian relief efforts. On April 2, 
April 19 and May 18, funds were appropriated for humanitarian aid to Kosovar Albanian refugees, 
bringing the total sum of American aid to over $200 million. These announcements were accompanied by 
press briefings by officials from the Department of State, FEMA and USAID. Joe Lockhart also paid 
attention to them in his daily press briefings.88 The First Lady visited Kosovar refugees in Macedonia in 
May 1999. In a briefing on May 18, she drew attention to the work of governmental and non-
governmental aid agencies and emphasised that the administration was committed to addressing the 
needs of all the refugees who had been forced to flee their homes.89  
 
What is striking about this brief summary of the Clinton administration's rhetoric on Kosovo, is that it 
emphasised national interests at least as much or even more than values. The two were usually 
presented alongside each other, with a threat to American values being described as a threat to American 
interests. Critical reporters sometimes questioned the legitimacy of either these motives, but never asked 
whether there was a conflict between the two or which was the decisive factor. Evidently, the White 
House believed the American people would be more likely to support military action in a country far away 
if they believed it could have a direct impact on their own lives than simply out of sympathy for a people 
in need. This is also reflected in the decision to limit the campaign to air strikes and not to commit 
ground troops to combat. As we saw in the first chapter, Congress was split right down the middle on the 
bombing campaign and pre-emptively voted against sending ground troops before this option was even 
on the table. The public and Congress alike were hostile to the idea of risking American lives for the 
Kosovar people. And so the White House argued that a human rights crisis in a distant country 
represented a legitimate threat to American national interests and required a forceful response. The 
following section will analyse this argument in more detail.  
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Defining the national interest 
From a constructivist perspective, the White House's rhetoric is significant because it reveals the 
normative context, the beliefs and expectations shared by politicians and the public. The normative 
context sets the parameters for how politicians can and cannot act and shapes their conceptions of 
interests. In the case of Kosovo, official rhetoric suggests that standing up to human rights abuses was in 
the American national interest and therefore an intervention was warranted. Had this always been the 
case, or was Clinton advancing a new norm, a new understanding of the national interest? Clinton's 
perception and presentation of the national interest was influenced by two fundamental notions which the 
American public shared. The first was the Weinberger doctrine, which outlined the conditions under which 
it was deemed legitimate to go to war. The second was the belief in the vital importance of American 
commitment to Europe and can be traced back to World War II and earlier conflicts in the Balkans.  
 
In 1984, in a speech entitled 'the uses of military force,' Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger outlined 
the conditions under which the United States could commit troops to a military intervention. These were 
as follows: first, vital national interests must be at stake, second, commitment must be wholehearted 
with the 'intention of winning', third, political and military objectives must be clearly defined, fourth, the 
forces committed must be sufficient to achieve these objectives, fifth, support of the public and Congress 
must be assured and sixth, committing combat troops must be a last resort.90 Weinberger's doctrine, as 
it came to be known, was heavily influenced by his interpretation of why the US lost in Vietnam. It was 
intended to prevent the US from ever again getting involved in a war that could not be won. Like Clinton, 
however, he fails to specify exactly what constitutes the national interest. Cori Dauber has argued that 
the Weinberger doctrine had a significant and lasting influence on the debate over the use of military 
force in the United States, to the extent that it has achieved 'hegemonic' status, whereby it is accepted 
as common sense by most of the American public. An important event here was Operation Desert Storm 
against Iraq in 1991, which met Weinberger's criteria and was widely regarded as a success, the binary 
opposite of Vietnam. Dauber points out that during the 1990s, even armed interventions that did not 
meet Weinberger's criteria, like the ones in Bosnia and Haiti were nevertheless presented in the language 
of the Weinberger doctrine to suggest that they did.91  
 
Dauber's argument is strongly supported by the analysis of the Clinton administration's rhetoric above. 
When we measure the Kosovo intervention against the Weinberger doctrine, the results are mixed. In 
their public statements, officials repeatedly stressed that Kosovo was of vital importance to US national 
interests and explained why this was the case. However, by including human rights in these interests, 
they probably adopted a much broader understanding of the national interest than Weinberger 
envisioned. They also highlighted that negotiations had led nowhere and that Milosevic would not yield to 
anything but a strong display of force. This was clearly part of a conscious campaign to explain and 
defend the war to the American public. On other counts of the Weinberger doctrine, they did not measure 
up so well. This is revealed by the critical questions posed by journalists. These focused on whether the 
administration had a clear exit strategy and whether the chosen means were sufficient to achieve this. 
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The decision to limit the war to air strikes relates to the fifth condition set out by Weinberger. In Vietnam, 
public support for the war was severely undermined by images of American soldiers returning in body 
bags. Minimising the number of casualties was one way to make the war acceptable to the American 
public.  
 
The administration's rhetoric on Kosovo could be seen as a half-hearted attempt to address the 
Weinberger doctrine, but the important point is that politicians and journalists alike consistently appealed 
to elements of the doctrine. This reveals a conviction on how and under what conditions wars should be 
fought that is deeply rooted in American society and can be traced back to the traumatic experience of 
the Vietnam war.92 Dauber noted that the Weinberger doctrine essentially 'collapses into a demand for 
public support.'93 But it did more than just influence how the war was presented, it also influenced how it 
was fought. Many contemporary observers pointed out that the means chosen were not optimal for the 
achievement of the stated objectives. As we saw earlier, the fact that politicians and military strategists 
believed that the war in Kosovo could be won by air power alone may have been a crucial factor in the 
decision to intervene at all. A more difficult and costly intervention might not have even been considered, 
a notion which is reinforced by the Clinton administration's failure to intervene in Rwanda earlier. The 
decision to rely on air power, then, was a crucial one, but it was not the product of a rational cost-benefit 
analysis. Instead, it can be traced back to shared convictions on under what conditions it is acceptable to 
risk American lives in a distant war. While appealing to the general principles of the Weinberger doctrine, 
however, the Clinton administration was also advancing a broader interpretation of it by including human 
rights in the values that defined American interests. They had to advance cautiously, however, because 
this idea had yet to enjoy broad public support.  
 
Like the Weinberger doctrine, the memory of the Second World War had left a strong impression on 
American consciousness. This is clear from the repeated references to the war in President Clinton's 
speeches. Two themes particularly stand out: the atrocities of the Holocaust and the failure of the 
international community to prevent it, and the importance of American commitment to peace and 
stability in Europe. Vice President Al Gore stated that 'when the people of Europe are at war, or divided, 
or enslaved, then our own freedom, security, and prosperity are at risk.'94 World War I and World War II 
were the ultimate examples of what would happen if America isolated itself from European affairs, and in 
both cases, acting later made the cost much greater. Clinton and his officials also repeatedly stressed 
Milosevic's previous record of brutality in Croatia and Bosnia. 'Bosnia taught us a lesson,' Clinton said in 
his February 13 radio address. 'In this volatile region, violence we fail to oppose leads to even greater 
violence we will have to oppose later at greater cost.'95 It also taught them another lesson, which may 
have been misguided: that an air campaign would be sufficient to bring Milosevic to his knees.  
 
References to previous wars in Europe and the Balkans reveal how American perceptions of norms and 
interests were shaped by these experiences. Firstly, it reveals a belief that humanitarian disaster can and 
should be prevented by forceful intervention and that the US has a moral responsibility to act in the face 
of ethnic conflict. The fact that these motives were repeatedly stressed indicates that they were accepted 
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as legitimate by a large part of the general public. Secondly, it reveals a strong conviction on the 
necessity of American commitment to Europe. The argument that violence in Kosovo could spill over into 
the region, create instability in Southeastern Europe, endanger the peace and prosperity of Europe as a 
whole and thereby threaten American national interests rests on a number of assumptions. The most 
important one is the notion, whether real or rhetorical, that Europe is the cornerstone of American 
security. To what extent this is a legitimate conviction is another discussion, the point here is that it is 
firmly rooted in the American collective memory. In the same way that Vietnam and the Weinberger 
Doctrine influenced the way in which wars were fought and presented, the memory of the Second World 
War and the previous conflicts in the Balkans influenced American perceptions of interests and norms. As 
journalist David Rieff put it in his book on the genocide in Bosnia: 'to have intervened on the side of 
Bosnia would have been self-defense, not charity (…) Freedom cannot be asserted, it must be 
defended.'96 Rieff believed that the United States and Europe were jeopardising their own future as 
multicultural and multiethnic societies by failing to defend these values in their own backyard. 
 
Kosovo was one of the first instances where the United States intervened in a conflict explicitly for 
humanitarian purposes. In doing so, President Clinton was advancing a new norm. Drawing on existing 
notions about the conditions under which armed intervention is legitimate, and about the nature of 
American strategic interests, he was also expanding the definition of the national interest to include 
standing up to human rights abuses. In order to do so, he had to convince the domestic and international 
public of the legitimacy of this norm. The quest for legitimacy meant that no American plane took off 
before all diplomatic options had been exhausted. Holbrooke's mission and the negotiations at 
Rambouillet all served to show the world and the American public that the only way to bring peace to 
Kosovo and avoid a wider regional conflict was by confronting Milosevic with military force. In this sense, 
Clinton was acting as a norm entrepreneur. This argument can also be reversed, by claiming that human 
rights came to be seen as national interests because of public pressure to this end. Kosovo, then, would 
be Clinton proving to the American public that he was committed to protecting and promoting human 
rights.97 There is certainly some validity to this argument, however, the administration's campaign to win 
public approval for their actions, described above, suggests that they were the ones convincing the 
public, not the other way around.  
 
At the beginning of this chapter, attention was drawn to social facts, facts which do not exist materially or 
objectively but which are agreed upon by humans and exist only in human consciousness. An analysis of 
the normative context reveals that some of the core assumptions underlying the decisions that were 
taken in regards to Kosovo can be traced back to social, not material, facts. The Weinberger doctrine and 
World War II not only influenced the way the war was presented and explained to the public, but also 
how and why it was conducted. The Weinberger doctrine resulted in the campaign being designed in such 
a way so as to minimise the risk of casualties. The collective memory of the Second World War shaped 
American perceptions of interests and their commitment to Europe. But the most important observation, 
from a constructivist point of view, is that there was a normative shift occurring. By making human rights 
a matter of national interest and advocating military action to protect them, Clinton was expanding the 
definition of the national interest. The following section will examine these norms in more detail and 
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attempt to determine their position in the norm life cycle, as described by Finnemore and Sikkink.  
 
Advancing humanitarian norms 
If states are social actors and their identities socially constructed, their behaviour is not only guided by 
material interests but also by norms and ideas. These norms are articulated and negotiated domestically 
and on the international scene. The legitimacy of a norm is not determined by power or capabilities but 
by the degree of consensus, the number of actors that share this value. In the case of Kosovo, we have 
seen that the Clinton administration advanced a new norm by emphasising the importance of defending 
values like human rights. The emergence of humanitarian norms can be traced back to the first Geneva 
Convention in 1864 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1949. While there is much 
controversy over the legitimacy of armed intervention on humanitarian grounds, there is much less 
controversy over the principle of universal human rights. This indicates that there is a growing consensus 
on humanitarian norms. So how did these norms influence the decision to intervene in Kosovo, and the 
way in which the intervention was carried out?  
 
Various authors have argued that key members of the Clinton administration had personal motives for 
wanting to act on Kosovo. When asked by a reporter about his 'pent-up feelings about what is happening 
in the Balkans,' Bill Clinton stated that he was personally motivated by the desire to prevent another 
Bosnia from taking place.98 Al Gore had previously been very critical of George H.W. Bush's cautiousness 
in the Balkans and was determined to reverse this. Madeline Albright had narrowly escaped the Nazis and 
lost a number of family members in the Holocaust.99 She repeatedly drew parallels between Kosovo and 
the Holocaust and stated that she would not allow such a thing to happen on her watch. Her vocal 
endorsement of intervention in Kosovo on personal grounds gave rise to the campaign being referred to 
as 'Madeline's war.'100 Both Clinton and Albright stated personal motives while connecting them to 
universally shared norms, such as the responsibility to prevent ethnic violence and protect innocent 
civilians and the necessity to prevent history from repeating itself. The same argument has been made 
for NATO as a whole. Adam Roberts wrote that 'the NATO states were united by a sense of shame that, in 
the first four years of atrocious wars in the former Yugoslavia, they had failed, individually and 
collectively, to devise coherent policies and engage in decisive actions.'101 
 
It is impossible to determine to what extent these moral considerations directly influenced the decision to 
intervene in Kosovo. However, the fact that they were articulated reveals shared understandings between 
politicians and the public on what constitutes appropriate behaviour. In this narrative, humanitarian 
norms were permissive norms because they constituted generally accepted principles and beliefs which 
lend legitimacy to the decision to intervene. The fact that human rights were such a key part of the 
official rhetoric reveals the degree of consensus on this norm. No reporter questioned the validity of the 
concept of human rights or humanitarian objectives. They only questioned to what extent these were 
legitimate grounds to go to war against a sovereign nation, and whether the means chosen corresponded 
to these objectives. This is where Clinton acted as a norm entrepreneur. By arguing that human rights 
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violations in Kosovo represented a threat to American national interests, he advanced the norm of 
humanitarian intervention.  
 
Once articulated as a cause for action, norms and values influenced the way the campaign was fought. As 
we have seen above, Quentin Skinner stated that when a politician articulates certain ideas and principles 
as motives for his actions, he then has to act in a way that is compatible with those motives. The Clinton 
administration claimed that its objective was to stop the killing and end the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. 
Doing so was both a moral obligation and served national interests. The NATO campaign had to reflect 
these motives. Many critics questioned whether an air campaign could do anything to protect the Kosovar 
people. This was a strategic decision based on other considerations, as we have seen above. But, anxious 
to prove that it was indeed addressing the humanitarian crisis, the Clinton administration put out a large 
volume of statements on various humanitarian relief efforts and undertook various efforts to appropriate 
the funds necessary to support this.  
 
Skinner also believed that an 'innovative ideologist' can manipulate the normative context to justify his 
actions, and if he succeeds in this his actions become a precedent. If the intervention in Kosovo was 
accepted as legitimate by the public and by the international community, it would lower the threshold for 
similar interventions. So did Kosovo trigger a normative shift? In the aftermath of the war, debates over 
the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention were given a new impulse. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
challenged the 54th session of the General Assembly to reach a consensus on the issue of humanitarian 
intervention. This ultimately responded in a prescriptive framework called the Right to Protect (R2P). 
Cristina Badescu argues that R2P represented a normative shift in order to move the discourse away from 
discussions on the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention and focus more on the protection of 
human rights.102  
 
In 1999, the concept of human rights, and their universality, appear to have been internalised in Western 
society. But the doctrine of humanitarian intervention certainly was not, and this norm faced many 
obstacles: most notably its conflict with another fundamental norm in international society, the norm of 
state sovereignty, but also because it was not widely accepted by the American public as a legitimate 
cause to go to war. In this sense Clinton can be considered a norm entrepreneur, though in many ways a 
reluctant one. He endorsed the humanitarian objectives of the campaign but stopped short of risking 
American lives, and was careful to note that American 'cannot, and should not, do everything or be 
everywhere.' In this regard he was more cautious than his British colleague Tony Blair, who was much 
more aggressive in promoting the new norm and did not shy away from committing ground troops and 
risking British lives in the conflict.103 In addition to this, NATO's intervention in Kosovo was certainly not 
uncontroversial. In the US, Congress and the public were divided on the legitimacy of the intervention. It 
was carried out in the margins of what the international community deemed acceptable, with two 
permanent members of the Security Council, Russia and China, opposing it. But it did help to challenge 
the dominant discourse on humanitarian intervention. In that sense, the norms and values championed 
by the United States and NATO to justify their intervention in Kosovo had a large impact precisely 
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because it was so controversial. There was certainly a normative shift occurring, but it was far from 
evident that a 'norm cascade' was on the way.  
 
Conclusion 
The constructivist perspective reveals that the Clinton administration did not act on the basis of objective 
material interests. Instead, its behaviour was shaped by social facts, like shared notions about the 
grounds on which it is legitimate to carry out a military intervention, and norms of behaviour, like human 
rights. These perceptions were informed by social facts, like the Weinberger doctrine, the memory of the 
two World Wars, the national trauma of Vietnam, and the images of bloodshed in the Balkans which had 
dominated American television screens over the previous decade. What is most striking about Clinton's 
rhetoric is his expansion of understandings about what constitutes the national interest to include 
standing up to human rights abuses. Humanitarian norms, widely shared but seldom accepted as grounds 
for war, were increasingly incorporated into the justification of an armed intervention. It is in this sense 
that Clinton was advancing a new norm. This norm in turn did not only influence the way in which the war 
was presented and defended, but also the way it was fought.  
 
The role of norms and values then, was not to act as a 'Trojan Horse,'104 designed and constructed to 
disguise more sinister motives. Instead, norms influenced identities and informed understandings of the 
national interest among politicians and the public. The Clinton administration did not always act on 
objectively defined interests, but on perceptions of interests. Understandings about what does and does 
not constitute the national interest vary and can change overtime. This was clearly the case in the 
decision to go to war over Kosovo. However, one way in which both President Clinton and the 
constructivist narrative fall short is in explaining exactly why it is in the national interest to stand up to 
human rights abuses in a country far away. This is where Gramsci comes in. The next chapter will draw 
on Gramscian insights to elaborate on the relationship between values and interests.  
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III. Hegemony: a Gramscian analysis 
 
As the previous chapters have made clear, the need to achieve consensus was a driving force in the 
decision to intervene in Kosovo. There was consensus in the international community that what was 
happening in Kosovo was bad, consensus (however fragile) among NATO members that an intervention 
was warranted and a forceful campaign for domestic consensus on the campaign by the Clinton 
administration. This chapter draws on Gramscian insights to investigate the meaning of this consensus, 
and especially to what extent it serves American interests. Is consensus just another word for American 
hegemony? Were human rights part of a broader ideological agenda which was being pushed by the US 
and its allies, one which served the material interests of the economic elites? Like the previous chapter, it 
starts by introducing the theoretical framework. It then moves on to a Gramscian analysis of what we 
have learned in the previous two chapters. 
 
Gramsci, the neo-Gramscians and the issue of humanitarian intervention 
Antonio Gramsci was an early twentieth century Italian Marxist. In order to understand why the working 
classes failed to rise up against the bourgeoisie, Gramsci developed the concept of hegemony. He made 
an important distinction between ruling by coercion and ruling by consent. Coercion is represented by the 
state or political society, consent by civil society. He believed the bourgeoisie were able to dominate the 
working classes by establishing a hegemonic culture which dictated the norms and values in society. By 
propagating this as the common good, they were able to secure the consent of the working classes with 
the social order they had created. This is what Gramsci calls the 'common sense of an epoch', a tacit 
acceptance of the existing social order. 
 
While Gramsci developed his thinking in relation to class struggle in Italy, his ideas have recently been 
applied to international relations and international political economy. The neo-Gramscian school 
originated in two articles published by Robert Cox in 1981 and 1983. The first article, entitled 'Social 
forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory', argued along Gramscian lines 
against the ahistorical problem-solving approach which characterised the realist school, and for the 
adoption of a historical critical theory approach which seeks to understand how the existing international 
order has come about.105 He proposed a historical structure with three interrelated levels: ideas, material 
capabilities and institutions, or social forces (based on the organisation of production), forms of state 
(state-society complexes) and world orders. He then used this to explain the relative stability of certain 
world orders, or hegemonies, such as the Pax Britannica of the mid-nineteenth century and the Pax 
Americana of the mid-twentieth century. British hegemony was founded firstly on naval superiority and 
secondly on broad acceptance of norms of free trade. American hegemony after the Second World War 
rested on a set of alliances and an international economic order, the Bretton-Woods system, strengthened 
by institutions like NATO, the UN, the IMF and the World Bank. Hegemony, Cox writes, consists of 'a fit 
between power, ideas and institutions.'106  
 
Robert Cox developed these ideas further in his 1983 article 'Gramsci, hegemony and international 
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relations: an essay in method.' He observed that Gramsci believed that social relations form the basis of 
international relations. For example, expansions in state power, like that of the US and the Soviet Union, 
followed significant social and economic transformations within these countries.107 He then went on to 
identify the conditions for a hegemonic world order. He wrote that 'historically, to become hegemonic, a 
state would have to found and protect a world order which was universal in conception (…) an order 
which most other states could find compatible with their interests (…) a globally conceived civil 
society.'108 This hegemony was supported by international organisations and institutions, and especially 
economic arrangements. With these observations, Cox established a broad framework for the application 
of Gramsci's ideas to the field of international relations.  
 
It is important here to distinguish clearly between the Gramscian notion of hegemony and the 
conventional understanding of hegemony in international relations. The term hegemony is often used to 
describe one state's dominance over other, less powerful states. For the Gramscians, simple dominance 
based on power is not enough to achieve hegemony. It has to be supplemented by a broad cultural and 
ideological consensus on the 'structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that 
permeates a whole system of states and non-state entities.' These values and understandings have to be 
internalised to the degree that they 'appear to most actors as the natural order.'109 Hegemony, therefore, 
is not about the ability to impose one's will on other states. It is about the ability to determine the set of 
values and understandings that form the basis of world order. Hegemonic power, then, is normative 
power, that is, the ability to determine what is right and what is wrong and achieve consensus on this.  
 
After Cox, a number of other scholars followed. In 1993, Stephen Gill published Gramsci, historical 
materialism and international relations, a collection of articles and essays which applied Gramscian 
perspectives to international relations. In the introduction, Gill made several suggestions for a Gramscian 
research agenda. This included 'the concrete historical study of the emerging world order, in terms of its 
economic, political and socio-cultural dimensions,' including processes of globalisation and the social basis 
of international relations.110 To this day, most of the neo-Gramscian research has focused on the political 
and economic implications of hegemony, although some work has also been done on the cultural and 
ideological dimensions.111 Some of the socio-cultural implications of hegemony will be discussed in more 
detail below.  
 
Gill's collection included a number of fundamental contributions to the field of study. While Cox had 
mainly focused on Gramsci's historical materialist critical theory approach and the concept of hegemony, 
other scholars delved deeper into Gramsci's insights. Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy drew more 
attention to how hegemony is attained by what Gramsci called an historical bloc, a term he borrowed 
from earlier Marxist thinker Georges Sorel. In order to achieve hegemony, a group must have a critical 
self-understanding (awareness of position in the mode of production and the potential this creates), form 
alliances with intellectuals (who supply moral and intellectual support), capture the ideological realm and 
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assure economic development to satisfy allies. The alliance that achieves hegemony is called an historical 
bloc.112 Augelli and Craig then went on to apply these insights to US policy towards the Third World 
during the 1980s. US hegemony was established partly by the use of force, but also by working through 
international civil society (such as economic assistance) and through international organisations. This was 
demonstrated by the support of the UN for the Gulf War in 1990.113 This framework for understanding 
foreign policy interventions can be usefully applied to military interventions where clear material interests 
are at stake, but it also sheds light on humanitarian interventions like the one in Kosovo where material 
or strategic interests coincide with humanitarian motives. 
 
So far, it may seem like neo-Gramscians trace all state actions back to economic interests. However, it is 
not quite so simple. In the same collection, Mark Rupert elaborated on the internal relation between 
coercion and consent and the corresponding relation between political society and civil society. Civil 
society transcends class divisions. Rupert makes the important observation that Gramsci did not believe 
all political and cultural practices can be reduced to economic interests. Instead, 'a necessary condition 
for the attainment of hegemony by a class or class fraction is the supersession of their narrow economic 
interests by a more universal social vision or ideology.'114 In other words, an historical bloc may have its 
position in the relations of production as its power base, but that does not mean that all of its actions are 
motivated by socio-economic interests. Rupert believed that globalisation was creating a global civil 
society under the hegemony of international capital.115 This concept of a global civil society is particularly 
relevant to the study of humanitarian intervention, because it draws attention to universally shared 
norms and values, and their origin in social relations. Mark Rupert has written a number of other articles 
which relate the concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony to globalisation and anti-globalisation 
movements.116  
 
Stephen Gill further developed Gramscian insights into world order in a later study entitled Power and 
resistance in the New World Order. This book explored the post-Cold War world order which left the 
United States as the only superpower in an overwhelmingly neoliberal world with few viable challengers. 
While the 1980s had seen a preoccupation with the decline of US power, the challenge of the 1990s was 
to address the role of the US in the new world order and 'the wider implications of US dominance, 
imperialism and hegemony in an era of intensified globalisation.'117 Like Rupert, Gill draws attention to 
the central role of global civil society in a global hegemony. In the post-Second World War American 
hegemony, this involved the promotion of mass consumption capitalism and the creation of global 
institutions, and the claim that US leadership was in a universal interest.118 This claim to universality is 
important because it echoes Gramsci's 'common sense of an epoch' which draws attention to the role of 
culture and ideology in a hegemony. Likewise, a hegemonic global liberal order requires a coherent 
ideology, with basic principles which most if not all of its constituents can underline.  
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This concept of global civil society is not without its problems, however. In a 1998 article, Randall 
Germain and Michael Kenny criticised a number of the claims made by the neo-Gramscian school. One 
related to their failure to sufficiently historicise Gramsci's ideas, a criticism which has been addressed in a 
number of articles by Adam Morton.119 The other relates to Gramsci's understanding of the relationship 
between civil society and the state, as expressed in the simple equation: state = political society + civil 
society. Germain and Kenny argue that it is impossible to speak of a global civil society in the absence of 
a transnational political society as its counterpart. However, they do acknowledge that Robert Cox 
addresses this problem to some extent with his notion of the 'internationalisation of the state' to 
correspond to the internationalisation of production. An important aspect of this is the broad ideological 
consensus of mulilateral organisations and key government agencies of the most important economies. 
Cox believes the 'international state' that corresponds with global civil society is not so much a 
supranational entity as a broad ideological consensus.120 Although Germain and Kenny are not quite 
convinced by this argument, it is quite sufficient for our purposes here.  
 
So far, little mention has been made of human rights in relation to the neo-Gramscian school of thought. 
However, a number of concepts have been introduced that can be fruitfully applied to the study of human 
rights and humanitarian intervention. To begin with, Gramsci's notion of hegemony challenges the realist 
understanding of hegemony as dominance, as a simple expression of coercive power. Instead, Gramscian 
hegemony has a normative quality, in that it requires the promotion and widespread acceptance of 
certain norms and values. In this sense, the neo-Gramscians agree with constructivists that norms are 
essentially socially constructed, although the Gramscians strictly trace this process back to the relations 
of production. The relationship between political society and civil society is also important, because it 
rejects the notion that the state can be divorced from social and cultural forces. A number of neo-
Gramscian scholars have drawn attention to the possibility of a global civil society which would entail 
increasing consensus on morals, values and rights. This could be the key to understanding the notion of 
universal human rights and the legitimacy of using armed force against a sovereign state to enforce 
them. 
 
The various neo-Gramscian scholars discussed here have created a theoretical framework for 
international relations that challenges some of the key notions of rationalist and constructivist theory. By 
adopting a historical critical theory approach, they create room to question the international order and 
how it came about, particularly using the concept of hegemony to understand issues of US dominance 
and globalisation. The neo-Gramscian school firmly roots hegemony in socio-economic forces, tracing it 
back to the dominant players in the mode of production. Yet they all acknowledge the central role of 
culture in creating consensus on a certain world order. Some Gramscian scholars have studied the 
implications of this in the cultural and ideological realm, but the role of human rights and humanitarian 
intervention in this world order has yet to be addressed. A deeper analysis of these issues from a 
Gramscian perspective may yield important new insights. From this viewpoint, the idea of universal 
human rights is essentially a byproduct of globalisation and the spread of a set of norms and values 
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originating in Western civilisation. The search of consensus in international politics plays a key role in 
neo-Gramscian thought, and this is certainly a useful tool to apply to cases of humanitarian intervention, 
which almost always involve an appeal to the international community to legitimise unilateral action.  
 
A Gramscian analysis of Kosovo 
So was NATO's intervention in Kosovo an expression of American hegemony? And if so, what does this tell 
us about the meaning of norms and values in the decision to intervene? The above summary has given us 
a number of guidelines for a Gramscian analysis of the events. The first is to identify the world order 
which Cox wrote about. What did it consist of, and to what extent was it supported by universal 
consensus? And what is the place of humanitarian intervention within this world order? The second step 
is to uncover the mechanics and instruments of this hegemony. This involves an analysis of the role of 
international organisations and international civil society, and the norms and values that they articulate 
and defend to achieve consensus. Finally, a Gramscian analysis would not be complete without identifying 
the winners, that is, who actually benefited from the world order that was being promoted. That is what 
the final section of this chapter will address.  
 
'A world order which was universal in conception?' 
On December 2 and 3, 1989, US President George H.W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met in 
Malta and announced the demise of the Cold War order. Bush stated that 'we stand at the threshold of a 
brand new era of U.S.-Soviet relations' and Gorbachev declared that 'the world is leaving one epoch and 
entering another. We are at the beginning of a long road to a lasting, peaceful era.'121 Was this the 
beginning of a new world order based on universally shared values and beliefs? Not quite. In a 
conversation with Pope John Paul II, Gorbachev expressed his frustration at those who wanted to renew 
Europe 'only on the basis of Western values.'122 Meanwhile, in a private conversation, Bush and German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed that Gorbachev knew little about Western values.123 Evidently, there was 
still some way to go before the world's superpowers would agree on the shape of the world to come.  
 
Yet by all appearances, the 1990s saw the triumph of Western values. Many observers interpreted the 
end of the Cold War as the triumph of liberalism.124 Bush and his Secretary of State James Baker stated 
that it was now time to build a 'democratic peace' characterised by political and economic reform in 
Russia and the other newly independent states. The increasingly popular notion was that war is very 
unlikely among free and democratic states.125 The Clinton administration coined the phrase 'democratic 
enlargement' to summarise its foreign policy goals: to promote democracy and free trade and contain 
regimes that represented a threat to these values. This started in Central and Eastern Europe. In his first 
term, Clinton also provided $4.3 billion in aid to Boris Yeltsin's Russia to stimulate economic reform. 
Russian properties were rapidly privatised and trade between Russia and the US grew at a high rate.126 
Rather than retreating into isolationism, successive presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton both 
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showcased a firm commitment to internationalism and to reshaping the world according to American 
values. 
 
In 1987, the Soviet negotiator Georgi Arbatov had told his American counterparts: 'we are going to do a 
terrible thing to you- we are going to deprive you of an enemy.'127 He was not alone in questioning 
whether the US could maintain its position in the world without an obvious enemy like the Soviet Union. 
Many observers were surprised at the general durability of American dominance after the end of the Cold 
War. In response to this, John G. Ikenberry argues that the United States established two orders after the 
end of World War II. One was the containment order, designed to counter the threat of communism. The 
other was the liberal order, which was a response to problems internal to Western society and economy. 
The liberal order did not only survive the end of the Cold War, it actually thrived. The 1990s saw the 
expansion of the liberal order into Eastern Europe and increasing acceptance of the values on which it 
was based in parts of the world that were formerly in the Soviet sphere of influence. Ikenberry believed 
that the hegemony of the United States was becoming more stable, firstly, because it exercised restraint 
and genuinely facilitated international cooperation, and secondly, because it 'has become institutionalised 
and path-dependent, that is, more and more people will have to disrupt their lives if the order is to 
radically change.'128 Ikenberry is not a Gramscian, but his depiction of US hegemony is not a far cry from 
how Gramsci understood it. Like Gramsci, Ikenberry's hegemony does not just rely on power but also on 
the ability to determine the structures and values that govern international politics with the voluntary 
acquiescence of less powerful states.  
 
Another way to understand the post-Cold War world order is by the concept of regulative peace. 
According to Ian Clark, the regulative peace consisted of an extension of Western values and institutions 
to include the vanquished states. This included the promotion of democratisation and free trade, 
mentioned above, but also multilateralism, through the expansion of the EU and NATO, and human 
rights. Clark argues that there was an increasingly explicit assertion of liberal values like human rights as 
universal values. These were, however, distinctly Western values and were inextricably tied to Western 
power.129 The victory of liberalism, then, was mostly an American victory. Liberalism became a 
prescriptive model for states, regulating not just international behaviour, but 'the nature of states 
themselves.'130 James Richardson pointed out that the liberal order also had a strong normative 
component: 'those who do not conform with prevailing norms are presented as culturally and historically 
retarded, their norms and values outmoded and not worthy of preservation.'131 All of these scholars, 
then, believe that the post-Cold War order was firmly based on Western values and that the United States 
took an active role in promoting the spread of these values. But the extent to which these values were 
internalised can be debated. Certainly the bloody conflict in the Balkans demonstrated that this process 
was hardly complete.  
 
The importance of American power in the post-Cold War order can hardly be overestimated. Various 
authors have pointed out that unilateralism, not multilateralism, was the defining characteristic of the 
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post-Cold War order. American industrial and military power was unrivaled and the concept of 
multilateralism was more rhetorical than real. The Gulf War illustrated the dominance of the US very 
clearly. Krauthammer stated that the US essentially 'acted alone' while 'still worshiping at the shrine of 
collective security.'132 Ikenberry has also pointed out the potential destabilising effect of American 
unilateralism on the new world order. He wrote that the post-Cold War order was 'built on a contradictory, 
shifting and unstable mix of international norms, great power interests and American military 
predominance.'133  
 
So how did human rights figure in the new world order? The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
adopted in 1948. The claim to universality was present from the beginning, but it began to be asserted 
more aggressively after the end of the Cold War. One explanation for this is that human rights were part 
of the broader set of liberal values which Western nations sought to promote.134  Another explanation is 
that the matter gained more urgency in the new world order. During the Cold War, the United States and 
the Soviet Union had supported a large number of regimes in unstable countries. The end of the Cold War 
meant that the superpowers withdrew their support from many of these regimes, leading to a breakdown 
of authority, creating political vacuums and resulting in humanitarian emergencies. During the 1990s, the 
UN increasingly labeled such humanitarian emergencies as threats to international peace and security 
and increasingly began to accept that in some cases, the international norm of state sovereignty might be 
subordinate to the norm of human rights.135 The previous chapter already noted that there was a 
normative shift occurring which increasingly made sovereignty contingent on how states treated their 
own citizens. From a Gramscian perspective, however, this represents something bigger: increasing 
consensus on a set of values with a distinctly Western origin. This consensus was not accidental, it was 
pioneered by international institutions and NGOs, increasingly embedded in international agreements like 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and backed up by western military power. From this 
perspective, the intervention in Kosovo was really an international police mission, carried out to enforce 
the rule of law. This was not a law that was encoded in international agreements, but a set of norms and 
values which were advanced by the most powerful country on earth.  
 
The new world order, then, had many characteristics of a new American hegemony. It is clear that the 
successive Bush and Clinton administrations sought to determine the conditions for a new world order, 
based on the core values of democracy, free trade and human rights. The 1990s saw the willing adoption 
of these values by a large number of former Soviet states. This does point to increasing consensus on 
this world order. However, it is important to note that these changes took place in the face of 
overwhelming American power. The United States did not use coercion to win over its former enemies, 
but it was the realisation that the Cold War could not be won that heralded the end of the Soviet Union. 
Therefore it is very much the question whether these values were really internalised to the degree that 
Gramsci described. The bloody wars in the Balkans that lasted throughout the 1990s were transgressions 
against this world order, demonstrating that it was still a work in progress. For this world order to become 
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'universal in conception', an internalisation of these values would have to take place, much like they 
arguably did in Western Europe in the years following World War II. This is the nature of hegemony. It is 
not a stationary state of being, it is constantly being constructed and negotiated.  
 
The mechanics of hegemony 
As we have seen, the most important instruments of hegemony are international institutions and 
international civil society. International institutions include organisations like the UN and its various 
organs, the EU, and NATO as well as international agreements like the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and, on the economic side, the IMF, the World Bank and aid organisations like USAID. International 
civil society is represented by NGOs and individual activists. All of these played a role in NATO's 
intervention in Kosovo.  
 
Although NATO ultimately acted on its own initative, the role of the UN should not be underestimated. In 
March 1998, Security Council Resolution 1160 condemned the violence in Kosovo in general terms and 
called on both Yugoslav and Kosovar leaders to cease hostilities. Significantly, by invoking Chapter VII of 
the UN charter, it identified the conflict as a a threat to international peace and stability.136 Six months 
later, Resolution 1199 was worded more firmly and placed the blame much more squarely on Milosevic's 
government.137 Both resolutions were adopted unanimously by the Security Council, with only China 
abstaining. NATO members argued that the two resolutions gave them a firm mandate for acting in 
Kosovo, because they identified the conflict as a threat to international peace and stability and 
condemned human rights violations.138 This was despite the Russian insistence that they only supported 
the resolutions on the understanding that they would not be used to justify military action. They also 
pointed to statements by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan which strongly condemned the violence. On 
his part, Annan was careful not to offend the NATO allies but he did point out that the mandate for the 
use of force belonged to the Security Council.139  
 
After the bombing began, Russia, Belarus and India proposed a resolution to the Security Council 
condemning NATO's actions and demanding an immediate end to the campaign. The resolution was 
defeated, however, by 12 votes to 3. Only Russia, China and Namibia voted for the resolution. The list of 
those who voted against included the five NATO members and friendly nations like Argentina and Brazil 
as well as less likely allies such as Malaysia and Gambia.140 This was a significant event because for the 
first time in history, a majority in the Security Council 'either legitimated or acquiesced with the use of 
force justified on humanitarian grounds in a context where there was no express Council 
authorisation.'141 For NATO, this reaffirmed the legitimacy of their actions. From a Gramscian perspective, 
it is evidence of the inability of counter-hegemonic forces to successfully challenge the emerging norm.  
 
The NATO countries were not confident enough to risk proposing their own resolution supporting their 
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actions to the Security Council or the General Assembly. In the Security Council, such a resolution would 
inevitably be vetoed by China and Russia, but in the General Assembly it could have been passed if a two 
thirds majority voted in favour.142 Nonetheless, the proceedings in the Security Council demonstrated that 
the actions of NATO could be supported by a relatively large international consensus. The unanimous 
adoption of resolutions 1160 and 1199 reflect an international consensus that Milosevic had crossed the 
line in Kosovo. This included not only NATO and its allies, but also Russia and other strongly anti-
interventionist countries. As we have seen, for Russia the fear of being isolated internationally played a 
key role in their decision not to mount strong opposition against NATO. This may well have played a role 
for other countries as well. The actual intervention went a step further but still only a few countries 
protested. Evidently, the UN was a major factor in constructing international consensus, at least on paper, 
on the gravity of the situation in Kosovo and the legitimacy of using armed force to punish the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.  
 
International institutions did not just address political aspects of the conflict, they were also concerned 
with the economic implications. In April 1999, the IMF published a paper entitled 'The economic 
consequences of the Kosovo crisis' which made a preliminary assessment of the effect of the crisis on 
neighboring countries (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not a member of the IMF or the World 
Bank). The report expressed concern at the possible impact of the crisis on the region, especially the 
destabilising effect of refugees, damage to trade and investment and postponement of economic reforms. 
Its recommendations mainly consisted of financial and humanitarian assistance to the countries 
impacted.143 Representatives of 33 countries and 7 international agencies met on April 27, 1999, while 
the bombing was still under way, to discuss the report. The representatives agreed to provide financial 
assistance to the countries involved in the short term, but also addressed measures to be taken to ensure 
the stability of the region in the longer run. These measures would take into account 'the political and 
humanitarian as well as economic and social factors, including plans for post-conflict reconstruction and 
recovery needed to ensure stability in the region in the medium term.'144  
 
Plans for the reconstruction of Kosovo and the region were quickly put into action. On June 10, 1999, the 
day the air campaign was suspended, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was created at the 
initiative of the EU. Partners included all regional countries except Milosevic's Yugoslavia, international 
insitutions like the EU, the UN, NATO, the IMF, the World Bank, and a host of other regional and 
international organisations. The Pact was designed to promote the stability of the region, stimulate 
economic reconstruction and facilitate eventual integration in the EU.145 The Stability Pact did not 
originate in the Kosovo crisis, plans for an initiative of this kind had existed for some time. It does, 
however, demonstrate the role of financial institutions in the international order. From a Gramscian 
perspective, the involvement of the international community in dictating the economic future of the 
region is a clear expression of hegemony. Indeed, it does not take a large stretch of the imagination to 
draw parallels to the economic reconstruction of Western Europe and the introduction of the Bretton 
                                               
142 Wheeler, ‘Reflections on the legality and legitimacy of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo’, 159 
143 IMF and World Bank, 'The economic consequences of the Kosovo crisis: a preliminary assessment of external financing needs and 
the role of the Fund and the World Bank in the international response' 16-04-1999, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/kosovo/041699.htm 
144 IMF press release, 'International community responds to the Kosovo crisis' 27-4-1999 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/kosovo/stm.htm 
145 'Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe' SCSP, Cologne, 10-06-1999 http://www.stabilitypact.org/constituent/990610-cologne.asp 
  41 
Woods system after World War II. Back in Washington, reporters did not hesitate to ask whether a 
Marshall Plan for Southeast Europe was on the table.146 Clearly, international involvement with Kosovo 
and the Balkans was not limited to defending human rights, it was also a prescriptive vision for the 
political and economic future of the region. It was to be integrated into the hegemonic American system 
which had first expanded into Western Europe after World War II and was now steadily advancing into 
Eastern Europe.  
 
As we have seen, a key element of neo-Gramscian theory is international civil society. Gramscians like 
Mark Rupert have studied globalisation and the degree to which this was creating a global civil society. 
Robert Cox emphasised that a hegemonic world order must not only consist of inter-state relations but 
also of a civil society that shares and promotes its values. In the case of Kosovo, the role of civil society 
is exemplified by the work of NGOs. Various NGOs were established in Kosovo during the 1990s to draw 
attention to the plight of the Kosovar Albanians under Serbian government. They worked with 
international NGOs to gain an audience outside of Kosovo. Human rights organisations like Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International led the way in calling for international engagement with Kosovo. 
Their activism helped to inform the public and put pressure on politicians to act. The presence of NGOs 
on the ground in Kosovo meant that massacres like the ones at Gornje Obrinje and Racak were quickly 
investigated and reported, forcing the international community to pay attention to Kosovo.147  
 
NGOs that engaged with Kosovo differed in their opinions on how the crisis should be dealt with. A few 
NGOs, like the Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) actively called for a military intervention, believing this 
was the only way to protect the Kosovar Albanians from Serbian atrocities. The majority, like HRW and 
Amnesty International stopped short of condoning a military intervention.148 However, they did pave the 
way for a more conditional understanding of the norm of sovereignty, making this increasingly contingent 
on a state's respect for the human rights of its own citizens. Human rights organisations 'have been at 
the forefront of international efforts that have changed the world order so that the norm of sovereignty is 
not immutable or unyielding.'149 NGOs and human rights activists actively promoted human rights as a 
norm so that it became increasingly internalised in international society.  
 
Another important component of civil society is the media. Much has been written about the 'CNN effect,' 
the influence of real-time media on political decisions. Instant television coverage of foreign and domestic 
policy problems can put pressure on politicians to act faster or make decisions they otherwise might not 
have made. This is particularly relevant for humanitarian crises abroad, where televised images of people 
suffering from hunger, disease or violence can generate high public pressure on politicians. Steven 
Livingston studied the role of the media during the Kosovo crisis, focusing on CNN. Throughout the 
1990s, the Yugoslavian wars received a disproportionate share of media attention compared to other 
humanitarian emergencies. The crisis in Kosovo received a huge amount of attention on all the main 
American television networks, starting in January 1999 and peaking in April during the first weeks of the 
bombing campaign, after which media attention steadily decreased. The overwhelming majority of stories 
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dealt with politics and negotiations, in second place were refugees, followed closely by the bombing 
campaign.150  
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, White House reporters did not shy away from asking critical 
questions about the limited military means employed and the insufficiency of NATO's tactics in achieving 
the stated goal of reversing the humanitarian crisis. They also did not refrain from reporting on civilian 
casualties which were victims of NATO's air strikes. Yet in the press room, the Western media were 
generally supportive of the humanitarian objectives of the campaign. As we mentioned earlier, no 
reporter questioned the validity of standing up for human rights, even though some questioned the 
legitimacy of using armed force or whether the chosen means corresponded to the stated objectives. 
Moreover, coverage of the mistakes of the Kosovo campaign did not significantly influence public support 
for the campaign.151 On the whole, we can say that the media reaffirmed the humanitarian norms and 
values which NATO professed to defend in Kosovo, and held their governments accountable to these 
norms. Like the NGOs, then, the American media reflected a general consensus on the validity of 
humanitarian norms.  
 
NATO actions were supported by a relatively strong, though incomplete, consensus among international 
organisations and international civil society. International political and financial institutions were deeply 
involved both in the decision to intervene in Kosovo and in the subsequent effort to rebuild the region 
after a decade of war. An important observation is that elements of civil society, like the NGOs and the 
media did not necessarily support the NATO campaign itself but did support the general humanitarian 
objectives. In other words, there was consensus on the norms and values but not on the means 
employed. The same was really true for the Security Council. This is why there was unanimous support 
for resolutions 1160 and 1199 condemning Milosevic's actions but not for NATO's actions to punish 
Milosevic. It was not the values but the means that were a matter of debate. Of course, the means 
cannot be viewed entirely separate from the values they were based on, since the debate was really 
about whether these values legitimated a response that violated the fundamental norms of sovereignty. 
Here again, liberal values were clearly on the rise but it stopped short of a complete consensus.  
 
The winners? 
As a Marxist, Gramsci did not see hegemony as something accidental or the product of simple power 
relations, but as an instrument that served the material interests of the bourgeoisie. The dominant 
position of the bourgeoisie in the modes of production formed the basis for the emergence of a historical 
bloc. In a hegemonic world order, the historical bloc would have to include the international economic 
elites as its power base, politicians who translated their interests into law and governance and 
intellectuals who supplied the ideological basis. Like neorealism, then, neo-Gramscianism is a materialist 
theory which traces state actions back to material interests. This is what most clearly distinguishes it 
from constructivism. So what interests were at stake in the Kosovo crisis, and who benefited from NATO's 
hegemonic behaviour? Who were ultimately the winners? The answer to this question is not so 
straightforward. 
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Some scholars, like Noam Chomsky, have attempted to identify the direct material interests that were at 
stake in Kosovo. Chomsky immediately rejected the notion that the US and NATO were acting in the 
name of humanitarian values, pointing to their inaction in the face of other human rights abuses by NATO 
allies like Turkey's oppression of the Kurds and Indonesia's state-sanctioned violence in East Timor. 
Kosovo was different, not because of the scale of Milosevic's atrocities, but because of the strategic 
location of the Balkans for the US. Contrary to other humanitarian crises, this one was taking place at 
NATO's doorstep in a region strategically placed between Europe and the Middle East. Instability in the 
Balkans was 'an unwelcome impediment to Washington's efforts to complete its substantial takeover of 
Europe.'152 John Dumbrell agreed with Chomsky that the Balkans were of importance to the US only 
because of their location. The region had little economic value and had no natural resources like oil. In 
the end, however, Dumbrell rejected the notion that the Clinton administration acted on the basis of 
interests. Instead, the intervention was 'a product of second term hegemonic confidence.'153 This 
confidence was far from complete, but Kosovo was certainly a building block to a more assertive foreign 
policy.  
 
Rather than acting on the basis of objective material interests, NATO acted to defend the liberal world 
order. NATO was the guarantor of peace and stability in this order. Milosevic's actions, first in Croatia and 
Bosnia, and then in Kosovo, represented a violation of the values on which this world order was founded. 
While he may not have represented a very tangible threat to the United States, there was a danger that 
Milosevic was the 'rotten apple that would spoil the barrel,'154 endangering the stability and security of 
the entire region, which in turn would present a threat to Europe. Furthermore, the credibility of NATO 
was at stake. As we have seen in the previous chapter, these arguments were voiced by the Clinton 
administration to demonstrate that the crisis in Kosovo presented a threat to US security. From a 
Gramscian perspective, however, it was not just about regional stability or about the credibility of NATO, 
but about the stability and credibility of the hegemonic world order. This was why NATO had no choice but 
to intervene.  
 
Conclusion 
The end of the Cold War did not bring about the demise of American hegemony. By all appearances, 
during the 1990s the values of the liberal world order, democracy, free trade and human rights, were 
gaining ground in many parts of the world. This was not the case in the Balkans, and NATO acted 
forcefully to bring this region into the liberal world order. In doing so, it was supported by multilateral 
organisations like the UN, the EU, the IMF and the World Bank. The liberal order was not complete, nor 
was it unchallenged. But there was no effective counter-hegemonic force, as demonstrated most clearly 
by the failure of Russia and China to effectively mount international opposition to NATO's actions. 
Moreover, the liberal order did have fundamentally hegemonic elements. It carried a strong normative 
quality, determining the rules and conditions under which international politics were to be carried out. It 
was a world order which actively sought and promoted shared values and understandings about the 
structure of the international community. This was clearly visible in the continuing debate over the 
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universality of human rights and the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.  
 
By intervening in Kosovo, NATO acted to defend a fragile consensus that Milosevic's aggression 
represented a threat to the values that govern the international order. It was consensus because in both 
political and civil society, there was general agreement on the fact that it was wrong for a government to 
engage in large-scale human rights abuses against its own citizens. This is reflected in political society by 
the unanimous adoption of resolutions 1160 and 1199 in the Security Council, and in civil society by the 
uncritical acceptance by the media and NGOs of the humanitarian values that NATO claimed to uphold. It 
was a fragile consensus because, while condemning the violence in Kosovo, it was clear from the outset 
that the Security Council would stop short of recommending an intervention to end the violence. It was 
also fragile because as it turned out, it was not enough to articulate these values, it had to be backed up 
by force. From a Gramscian viewpoint, force is not necessarily a sign of weakness, because even the 
most stable state requires law enforcement agencies. However, the necessity of staging a military 
intervention does denote that the limits of consensus are in sight. 
 
The important observation here is that hegemony, even when it is still under construction, is still worth 
studying. The liberal world order of the 1990s was not 'universal in conception' but its ambitions were 
arguably hegemonic. There was increasing acquiescence, if not yet complete consensus, on the 
legitimacy of armed intervention to defend universal humanitarian values. The claim to universality is the 
key to uncovering hegemonic ambitions. The world order of the 1990s was one that was under 
construction, and one that, with the defeat of one of its main adversaries, communism, had significant 
hegemonic potential. The conflict in Kosovo may not have directly threatened the material interests of the 
western elites, but it did represent a transgression against the values of the world order they had created 
and which was supported by their material power base. By launching a military intervention, NATO 
enforced these values in Kosovo and sent a clear message to the rest of the world.  
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Conclusion 
 
Why did NATO intervene in Kosovo? To what extent did they act on humanitarian motives, and to what 
extent did they act on their own interests? How did norms and values influence the way the war was 
fought and presented? And how significant were human rights? The constructivist and Gramscian 
perspectives both acknowledge that the defense of a set of values played a central role in the decision to 
intervene. Both would argue against a more straightforward depiction of the decision as one that was 
based on objective interests or a rational cost-benefit analysis. Both theories agree that norms and 
values are essentially socially constructed and that they influence the behaviour of states on the 
international scene. But they draw very different conclusions from this fact.  
 
For the constructivists, the decision to intervene in Kosovo reflected changing perceptions of the national 
interest and foreign policy priorities. The end of the Cold War ushered in an era where human rights 
became an increasingly pressing international concern. The constructivist analysis revealed that the 
decision to intervene in Kosovo was ultimately based on social, not material facts. While Clinton claimed 
to act in the national interest, and undoubtedly believed this himself, his perception and presentation of 
the national interest was not necessarily based on objective facts. It was the product of a set of beliefs 
that was shaped by historical experiences, like the two World Wars and Vietnam and by collective 
indignation at earlier offenses by Milosevic. It was also shaped by considerations of legitimacy, in 
particular on what conditions it was justifiable to risk American lives in war. And it was based on a shared 
understanding about what constitutes human rights, and the increasingly influential belief that these 
rights applied to all people irrespective of whether their governments respected them or not.  
 
President Clinton acted as a norm entrepreneur by expanding perceptions of the national interest to 
include standing up to human rights. Concern for human rights was on the rise during the 1990s, but 
never before had a state or an alliance of states explicitly justified an armed intervention against a 
sovereign state on humanitarian grounds. There was a normative shift taking place, not so much in the 
general belief in universal human rights, which at this point was hardly controversial anymore. What was 
shifting was the importance that was attached to the norm of human rights relative to the international 
norm of state sovereignty. More than ever before, the right to state sovereignty was presented as being 
contingent on a government's respect for the human rights of its citizens. Clinton and his NATO allies, 
especially Blair, took the lead in explaining to the world that an inexcusable breach of human rights like 
the ones Milosevic committed meant that he forfeited his right to sovereignty. Meanwhile, the Clinton 
administration had to explain to the domestic audience why it was important to stand up for the 
democratic and liberal values they enjoyed at home in a country far away.  
 
The norm of humanitarian intervention was advanced by NATO's war over Kosovo. It was a small step, 
however. The war over Kosovo was fought because it could be done with limited means and minimal loss 
of American lives, and Clinton was careful to point out that this did not mean the the US would commit 
itself to similar conflicts all over the world. On the international scene, the war, which many observers 
believed to be legitimate but illegal because of the absence of a Security Council Mandate, led to intense 
international debates on how to better deal with such crises. One of the most tangible products of this 
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was the R2P framework. In 1999, it may well have seemed that a norm cascade was imminent. But in 
2003 the United States invaded Iraq. The Bush administration stated many reasons to go to war against 
Iraq, including the alleged presence of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Saddam Hussein's support for 
terrorists, but the fact that the invasion was additionally and unconvincingly portrayed as a humanitarian 
intervention was a setback for the advancing norm. Today, the prospect of a norm cascade in favour of 
humanitarian intervention does not seem likely in the near future. So while the decision to intervene in 
Kosovo represented a normative shift, it was slight and by no means irreversible.  
 
The Gramscian analysis sheds a slightly different light on the Kosovo intervention. For the Gramscians, 
the intervention in Kosovo was a police mission designed to enforce the values on which the hegemony of 
the US was based. The demise of the Soviet Union ushered in an era of American unilateralism, which 
gave the United States unprecedented power to shape the international order. It did so not by 
establishing a simple dominance of other states based on its overwhelming military and economic power. 
Instead, it propagated a world order which was based on liberal values like democracy, free trade and 
human rights. These values formed the basis of western society and of its wealth. This world order was a 
prescriptive vision for how states should be structured and governed, and what fundamental rules they 
had to adhere to on the international scene. Milosevic's actions, first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, were a 
transgression against the values on which this world order was based. NATO's intervention was designed 
to bring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia back into the fold. It was supported not just by armed force, 
but also by international organisations like the UN, the EU, the IMF and the World Bank which helped to 
lend legitimacy to NATO's actions and ensure that after the war, Southeastern Europe would be rebuilt 
and restructured based on western values. It was also supported by an expanding international civil 
society, which pioneered the norm of human rights.  
 
What makes hegemony work is the combination of coercive force and ideological consensus. Coercive 
force was guaranteed by NATO's military power, and ideological consensus was clearly expanding during 
the 1990s. It was not complete, but such is the nature of hegemony. It is constantly being constructed 
and negotiated. What is important is that there was no effective counter-hegemony. In particular Russia 
failed to mount serious opposition to the war. In the end, it even turned out to be instrumental in 
bringing Milosevic to the negotiating table, because this was the only meaningful role it could play in the 
conflict. From a Gramscian perspective, the normative shift identified above represented an expansion of 
ideological consensus and thereby an expansion of American power. NATO's decision to intervene in 
Kosovo was based on values, but these values were not incidental. They were part of an ideological 
consensus which formed the basis of the world order that served the material interests of the elites. In 
this sense, the Gramscians reconcile realist and constructivist thought by recognizing the constructivist 
notion that state behavior can be traced back to social processes and identities, while rooting this firmly 
in material interests like the realists do.  
 
In the end, this analysis reveals that NATO's insistence that it acted to defend a set of values is a credible 
argument. Values were important, whether it was because they created legitimacy in the eyes of the 
public and the international community, or because they underpinned the world order on which American 
prosperity and security was based. Norms and values influenced the decision to intervene and the way 
the intervention was carried out. They were more than just rhetorical tools designed to disguise more 
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sinister motives. They informed politicians' perceptions of interests and set the parameters for state 
action. The world order that was being created during the 1990s was, more than ever before, or arguably 
since, one that was based on a set of values. These were distinctly western values and the constructivists 
and the Gramscians disagree on what purpose the proliferation of these values ultimately served. But 
they agree on their fundamental importance in influencing state behaviour.  
 
The constructivist and Gramscian perspectives have proven to be useful here because of their ability to 
go beyond a simple understanding of values and interests as binary opposites. It is all too easy to fall into 
the trap of depicting these two categories as mutually exclusive. We ask ourselves whether a state or 
politician acts on the basis of material interests or on the basis of genuine convictions, without 
acknowledging the that the two may very well be related. The constructivist perspective has shown that 
perceptions of interests are very much shaped by shared beliefs and understandings, by norms and 
values. It effectively traces interests back to social processes, and this proved helpful to understand why 
the Clinton administration made human rights a matter of national interest, and how this brought about 
the intervention in Kosovo. Its weakness is that it fails to recognise that the reverse may also be true, 
that material interests can shape norms and values. This is where the Gramscian perspective comes in 
useful. It shows that ideology has a power dimension, that it is based on material facts. In the case of 
Kosovo, human rights were a powerful norm because they were supported by American military and 
economic power. Constructivists believe that norms, values and ideas define interests, Gramscians 
believe that they ultimately serve interests. 
 
Another point of divergence for the two theories is that constructivism emphasizes change while 
Gramscianism is more interested in continuity. From a constructivist perspective, state behavior is based 
on social facts which are, by nature, fluid and continually changing. The developing norm of humanitarian 
intervention was evidence of this. For the Gramscians, the basic characteristics of the international order 
do not change, they continue to favour the strong over the weak. This brings out a weakness in 
Gramscian theory: it tends to place everything in a grand narrative about the dominance of the economic 
elites. To be fair, Gramscian scholars like Mark Rupert address this weakness by pointing out that for a 
hegemony to be effective, the narrow material interests of the elites must be superseded by a more 
universal ideology. Human rights therefore do not necessarily bear a direct relation to the material 
interests of the elites, but are one component of the wider world view that is being propagated. The 
events in Kosovo support this understanding of hegemony better than a more narrow reading of Gramsci.  
 
This exercise in the use of constructivist and Gramscian insights to NATO's intervention in Kosovo reveals 
both the values and the inherent danger of applying broader theoretical perspectives to historical events. 
When applying theory to a historical event, there is always the risk of adopting the facts to fit the 
preconceived notions that are present in the theoretical framework. This is more evident in the 
Gramscian analysis, with its insistence on a Marxian grand narrative. However, selecting and organising 
facts is a necessary component of all historical research. The same historical methods for judging and 
interpreting the facts apply when applying theoretical perspectives. Theory is valuable when applied 
critically, because it allows us to consider the facts from different viewpoints. If this analysis has 
succeeded in revealing different ways of looking at and thinking about the facts, then it has been a 
fruitful exercise.  
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